Wednesday, October 25, 2006

An Argument for Actualism

I came across an argument from van Inwagen for actualism recently. I was wondering what y'all thought about it. The idea is that to be red, in the most inclusive sense, is to be actually red. To fail to be red actually is to be red in no sense at all. Similarly, to exist in the most inclusive sense is to exist actually. To fail to exist actually is to exist in no sense at all. There is no relevant difference between redness and existence. So actualism.

The claim about redness seems right, but the corresponding claim about existence should offend possibilists. So the challenge is to note the relevant difference, if any, between redness and existence. There are clearly some moves to make here, but I was wondering what sort of move, if any, y'all found most attractive.

1 Comments:

Blogger Joshua said...

I think I deny the claim taht to fail to be actually red is to fail to be red in any sense at all.

I also deny the claim that to fail to exist is to fail to actually exist in any sense at all.

I think that there are several claims that need to be considered. We should keep in mind, while reading each of these, that relativism is true.

a is red

may be false. But that doesn't mean that

a is red at w

were w is a non-actual world, is false. This is why I deny that if something is not actually red then it is not red in any sense at all.

similarly,

a exists

may be false. But that doesn't mean that

a exists at w

where w is a non-actual world, is false. This is why I deny that if something doesn't actually exist, then it exists in no sense at all. It may be false that a exists. But there is a way that a exists, it exists in w.

8:14 AM  

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