Pro-Attitude Theology
In this post I'd like to discuss an issue I've discussed in more detail on my personal blog, The GLFer. Those who would like more details are encouraged to look at what I have written there.
First, the background. Western philosophical theology has been dominated by a certain approach to theology often called "perfect being theology". The central concept of perfect being theology is that of a great-making property, where a property is said to be great-making iff all other things being equal, something is greater if it has that property than if it lacks that property. (Great-making properties can be conceived of via analogy to intrinsically good-making features.) Given this concept, proponents of perfect being theology claims that something is divine iff it has every great-making property to the highest degree. And, of course, they claim that there is something that is divine. The central question, then, of perfect being theology is whether there is something that has every great-making property to the highest degree.
I would like to propose an alternative to perfect being theology. The alternative is what I call "pro-attitude theology". There are two versions of pro-attitude theology that I would like to discuss, a simpler one (addressed in my post on The GLFer entitled "Pro-Attitude Theology Redux") and a more complex one (addressed in "Perfect Being Theology and Pro-Attitude Theology). The central concept of both versions of pro-attitude theology, however, is the same. It is the concept of a pro-attitude worthy property, where a property is a pro-attitude worthy property iff there is some pro-attitude such that all other things being equal, something that has that property deserves to have that pro-attitude borne to it.
According to the first version of pro-attitude theology, something is divine iff there are some pro-attitude worthy properties such that it has those properties and because it has those properties it deserves having every pro-attitude borne to it to the highest degree. According to the second, on the other hand, something is divine iff it has every pro-attitude worthy property and for every pro-attitude worthy property P that it has and every pro-attitude A, if all other things being equal, something that has P deserves having A borne towards it, then it has P to such a degree that it deserves having A borne towards it to the highest degree. I take it that it is obvious how to construct the central questions of both versions of pro-attitude theology.
There is one interesting difference between the first version of pro-attitude theology and the second. The difference is that, on the first version, there may be different "ways of being divine". For one thing might be divine in virtue of having certain pro-attitude worthy properties while something else is divine in virtue of having other pro-attitude worthy properties. On the other hand, on the second version of pro-attitude theology, there aren't different ways of being divine. This is because each divine being has every pro-attitude worthy property according to the second version and has that property to whatever degree is necessary to make it the case that it deserves to have the corresponding pro-attitude borne to it to the highest degree.
Let me close with some remarks about my motivation for introducing pro-attitude theology as an alternative to perfect being theology. I do not do so because I find it plausible that there is a being that is divine in the pro-attitude theology sense although there is no being that is divine in the perfect being theology sense. I find it likely that there is no being that is divine in either sense. However, I think that it is worthwhile investigating this alternative to perfect being theology because I think that just as it is an interesting question whether there is a divine being in the perfect being theology sense, it is an interesting question whether there is a divine being in the pro-attitude theology sense. And whereas philosophical theologians in the Western tradition have addressed the first question, they have not addressed the second. In addition, it is an interesting question whether an affirmative answer to either the central question of perfect being theology or the central question of pro-attitude theology has any religious significance. Finally, one interesting question of perfect being theology is what properties a being must have in order to be divine; or, in other words, what properties are great-making and what does having these properties to the highest degree entail? Similarly, I think, it is an interesting question what properties a being must have in order to be divine in the (second version of) pro-attitude theology sense; in other words, what properties are pro-attitude worthy properties and to what degree does something have to have each of those properties in order to deserve to have the corresponding pro-attitude borne to it to the highest degree?
First, the background. Western philosophical theology has been dominated by a certain approach to theology often called "perfect being theology". The central concept of perfect being theology is that of a great-making property, where a property is said to be great-making iff all other things being equal, something is greater if it has that property than if it lacks that property. (Great-making properties can be conceived of via analogy to intrinsically good-making features.) Given this concept, proponents of perfect being theology claims that something is divine iff it has every great-making property to the highest degree. And, of course, they claim that there is something that is divine. The central question, then, of perfect being theology is whether there is something that has every great-making property to the highest degree.
I would like to propose an alternative to perfect being theology. The alternative is what I call "pro-attitude theology". There are two versions of pro-attitude theology that I would like to discuss, a simpler one (addressed in my post on The GLFer entitled "Pro-Attitude Theology Redux") and a more complex one (addressed in "Perfect Being Theology and Pro-Attitude Theology). The central concept of both versions of pro-attitude theology, however, is the same. It is the concept of a pro-attitude worthy property, where a property is a pro-attitude worthy property iff there is some pro-attitude such that all other things being equal, something that has that property deserves to have that pro-attitude borne to it.
According to the first version of pro-attitude theology, something is divine iff there are some pro-attitude worthy properties such that it has those properties and because it has those properties it deserves having every pro-attitude borne to it to the highest degree. According to the second, on the other hand, something is divine iff it has every pro-attitude worthy property and for every pro-attitude worthy property P that it has and every pro-attitude A, if all other things being equal, something that has P deserves having A borne towards it, then it has P to such a degree that it deserves having A borne towards it to the highest degree. I take it that it is obvious how to construct the central questions of both versions of pro-attitude theology.
There is one interesting difference between the first version of pro-attitude theology and the second. The difference is that, on the first version, there may be different "ways of being divine". For one thing might be divine in virtue of having certain pro-attitude worthy properties while something else is divine in virtue of having other pro-attitude worthy properties. On the other hand, on the second version of pro-attitude theology, there aren't different ways of being divine. This is because each divine being has every pro-attitude worthy property according to the second version and has that property to whatever degree is necessary to make it the case that it deserves to have the corresponding pro-attitude borne to it to the highest degree.
Let me close with some remarks about my motivation for introducing pro-attitude theology as an alternative to perfect being theology. I do not do so because I find it plausible that there is a being that is divine in the pro-attitude theology sense although there is no being that is divine in the perfect being theology sense. I find it likely that there is no being that is divine in either sense. However, I think that it is worthwhile investigating this alternative to perfect being theology because I think that just as it is an interesting question whether there is a divine being in the perfect being theology sense, it is an interesting question whether there is a divine being in the pro-attitude theology sense. And whereas philosophical theologians in the Western tradition have addressed the first question, they have not addressed the second. In addition, it is an interesting question whether an affirmative answer to either the central question of perfect being theology or the central question of pro-attitude theology has any religious significance. Finally, one interesting question of perfect being theology is what properties a being must have in order to be divine; or, in other words, what properties are great-making and what does having these properties to the highest degree entail? Similarly, I think, it is an interesting question what properties a being must have in order to be divine in the (second version of) pro-attitude theology sense; in other words, what properties are pro-attitude worthy properties and to what degree does something have to have each of those properties in order to deserve to have the corresponding pro-attitude borne to it to the highest degree?
posted by Greg Fowler at 12:53 PM
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