Easy Knowledge and Millianism
Millianism is the thesis that the meaning of a proper name is the object to which it refers. Some people who believe Millianism also endorse certain principles connecting the possession of a proper name to the ability of a thinker to think things about the named object and principles that allow the introduction of a proper name into language by way of a definite description. These philosophers seem to face a problem of easy knowledge. In this post I will present this puzzle of easy knowledge. I will note some of the replies that a Millian can give to such a puzzle, including the deflationist reply which says that we do have such easy knowledge but it is not as bad as one might expect. Finally, I will press the deflationist position with a worry and suggest the best response that a deflationist might give. Before I begin, I should note that this puzzle has been extensively discussed amongst the members of our little tribe for several years. so, many of the things I say here may have come up in conversations between us in the past. I have just recently become interested in this puzzle again because I recently heard a talk on this subject.
So, let's begin by presenting the puzzle. Let's assume that Millianism is true and introduce two new theses that will help generate the puzzle. The first thesis is that a person can introduce a proper name for an individual into a language simply in virtue of using a definite description that refers to that individual. For example, I can introduce a proper name for Benjamin Franklin into English by saying something like this: "Let 'Fred' be a proper name for the guy who invented bifocals". Similarly, I can introduce a proper name for the guy who invented the wheel by saying "let 'Gorg' be a proper name for the guy who invented the wheel". This trick can be used for anything that can be (properly) named and which can be picked out by a definite description.
The second thesis is that someone can have de re beliefs and other attitudes about an individual simply in virtue of possessing a name for that individual. So, for example, after introducing the name 'Gorg' for the inventor of the wheel, I can wonder whether Gorg was tall. I can believe of Gorg that he was a clever man. And I can (with the appropriate evidence) know that Gorg lived a long time ago.
With these theses in mind, we can now present the puzzle of easy knowledge. Suppose I introduce the name 'Gorg' by saying "let 'Gorg' be a proper name for the guy who invented the wheel". Now I think to myself that if anybody invented the wheel, then the guy I named 'Gorg' invented the wheel. I also think that if I named anyone 'Gorg', then Gorg is the guy I named. finally, I conclude that if anybody invented the wheel, then Gorg invented the wheel. At each step, I seem to be justified in my belief. Moreover, my beliefs are true. One migh think that these are justified, true beliefs that don't amount to knowledge. but, the situation certainly doesn't look like classical Gettier situations. So, we may reasonably conclude that I know that if anybody invented the wheel, then Gorg did. but, such knowledge seems too easy. How can I know anything about Gorg when I have never met him. Moreover, it seems that this trick can generalize in a way that indicates that I have a lot more knowledge than one might initially expect. This is the problem of easy knowledge.
There are several solutions to this puzzle. One might think that my beliefs about Gorg are unjustified or that even though they are not justified, they do now amount to knowledge. I think this is an interesting response which I am not going to explore in this post (though I may explore it in a later post). I think the best option here is to suggest that I fail to meet a safety condition on knowledge. Although I believe that if anyone invented the wheel, then Gorg did, in the nearby worlds where I form such a belief, it is not justified. I suspect this strategy will have many problems, but (as I indicated) I will not be exploring those problems here.
One might say that proper names cannot be so easily introduced. some Millians think there are two kinds of names out there: proper names and descriptive names. A name that is introduced by way of a description is a discriptive name. Moreover, although the meaning of proper names are the things they refer to, the meanings of such descriptive names are the descriptions that were used in their introduction. On this view, the content of the sentence "if anyone invented the wheel, then Gorg did" is actually "if anyone invented the wheel, then the guy who invented the wheel did". But, this is trivial knowledge that most people can have simply be reflection.
Finally, some people might think that although we can introduce a proper name with a description, we cannot have thoughts about the thing so named. This view breaks the connection between possessing a proper name and being able to have a thought about the thing named. (I believe this is Salmon's view).
These are some of the ways out of our puzzle of easy knowledge. But there are a few people out there who think the best option is simply to accept that we have such easy knowledge. (Some of us might even be attracted to such a view). Part of the job for these people is to explain why it isn't so bad to have such easy knowledge. But, their job is made even more difficult by the following fact. It seems that we are not able to act on knowledge such easy knowledge and yet knowledge that is acquired in the traditional way can typically be acted upon.
To make this problem more acute, let's focus on an example. Suppose that Ned the navigator is a man who is extremely good at getting to places given the appropriate information. In fact, he boasts that he can take anyone to any coordinate on Earth. However, Ned is also a philosopher and he introduces a name for the coordinates of the oldest tree in Washington state by saying "Let 'L' be a proper name for the coordinates of the oldest tree in Washington state". then, through a simple series of justified inferences he comes to know that if there is a location of the oldest tree in Washington state, then it is at L. Fred the navigator, on the other hand, has the same navigational abilities as Ned, but looks up the location of the oldest tree in Washington state in an encylopedia. Fred knows that if there is a location of the oldest tree in Washington state, then it is 48 degrees north by 124 degrees west. Now, since 'L' is a proper name for the location of the oldest tree in Washington state and since that location is 48 degrees north by 124 degrees west, it turns out that Ned and Fred know the exact same thing. Yet, if I were to ask to takes to the location of the oldest tree in Washington state, Ned wouldn't be able to take me there whereas Fred would. This seems like a difference that needs to be explained.
I take it that there are a couple of explanations available to the Millian who accepts easy knowledge. First, He can say that although we can have easy knowledge it is not usefull because there is some difference between the easy knowledge and regular knowledge. such a Millian would be required to explain what that difference is.
On the other hand, a Millian might simply say that we are looking for explanations in the wrong direction. He might simply say that the difference between easy knowledge and regulary knowledge lies in the fact that we have abilities to act on regular knowledge that we lack with mere easy knowledge. That is to say that knowledge is easy in virtue of the fact that we cannot act on it.
Finally, a Millian might simply reject explanations at this point and say that although there is a correlation between having abilities and having knowledge that is acquired in the traditional way, such a correlation need not be explained.
I think the first option is the way to go. I will quickly argue against each of the other two options and then explain how one might flesh out the first option in more detail. the Final option is not good because such a correlation will be a strong, perhaps necessary connection. It is hard to imagine, for example, a world in which most people's knowledge comes by way of naming and yet they are still able to act on that knowledge. It is hard to imagine, for example, a world in which Ned does exactly what he does in our actual world to come to know the location of the oldest tree in Washington and yet takes us right to the tree when we ask. Even if he did so, we would simply say that he was lucky in his guess.
The second option seems weird. It seems like easy knowledge is easy knowledge in virtue of the way it is acquired rather than in virtue of any correlation between our lack of abilities. Moreover, it seems intuitively plausible to say that there is a difference between Fred and Ned's knowledge that accounts for their differences in ability. This all leads me to believe that the first option is the one that a Millian who accepts easy knowledge should take.
Here is what such a Millian can say: Although Fred and Ned know the same things, Fred has an ability the Ned lacks because his knowledge is had under an appropriate guise or way of believing. Ned knows the location of the oldest tree in a particular way. He knows navigational facts in one way and the fact about the location of the oldest tree in another. So, he is not able to connect up those bits of knowledge and act appropriately. On the other hand, Fred's navigational knowledge and knowledge about the location of the oldest tree are had in the same way. So, he is able to connect up those bits of knowledge and act appropriately. So, it seems to me that the deflationist solution to the problem of easy knowledge is best when combined with an endorsement of Ways Millianism.
So, let's begin by presenting the puzzle. Let's assume that Millianism is true and introduce two new theses that will help generate the puzzle. The first thesis is that a person can introduce a proper name for an individual into a language simply in virtue of using a definite description that refers to that individual. For example, I can introduce a proper name for Benjamin Franklin into English by saying something like this: "Let 'Fred' be a proper name for the guy who invented bifocals". Similarly, I can introduce a proper name for the guy who invented the wheel by saying "let 'Gorg' be a proper name for the guy who invented the wheel". This trick can be used for anything that can be (properly) named and which can be picked out by a definite description.
The second thesis is that someone can have de re beliefs and other attitudes about an individual simply in virtue of possessing a name for that individual. So, for example, after introducing the name 'Gorg' for the inventor of the wheel, I can wonder whether Gorg was tall. I can believe of Gorg that he was a clever man. And I can (with the appropriate evidence) know that Gorg lived a long time ago.
With these theses in mind, we can now present the puzzle of easy knowledge. Suppose I introduce the name 'Gorg' by saying "let 'Gorg' be a proper name for the guy who invented the wheel". Now I think to myself that if anybody invented the wheel, then the guy I named 'Gorg' invented the wheel. I also think that if I named anyone 'Gorg', then Gorg is the guy I named. finally, I conclude that if anybody invented the wheel, then Gorg invented the wheel. At each step, I seem to be justified in my belief. Moreover, my beliefs are true. One migh think that these are justified, true beliefs that don't amount to knowledge. but, the situation certainly doesn't look like classical Gettier situations. So, we may reasonably conclude that I know that if anybody invented the wheel, then Gorg did. but, such knowledge seems too easy. How can I know anything about Gorg when I have never met him. Moreover, it seems that this trick can generalize in a way that indicates that I have a lot more knowledge than one might initially expect. This is the problem of easy knowledge.
There are several solutions to this puzzle. One might think that my beliefs about Gorg are unjustified or that even though they are not justified, they do now amount to knowledge. I think this is an interesting response which I am not going to explore in this post (though I may explore it in a later post). I think the best option here is to suggest that I fail to meet a safety condition on knowledge. Although I believe that if anyone invented the wheel, then Gorg did, in the nearby worlds where I form such a belief, it is not justified. I suspect this strategy will have many problems, but (as I indicated) I will not be exploring those problems here.
One might say that proper names cannot be so easily introduced. some Millians think there are two kinds of names out there: proper names and descriptive names. A name that is introduced by way of a description is a discriptive name. Moreover, although the meaning of proper names are the things they refer to, the meanings of such descriptive names are the descriptions that were used in their introduction. On this view, the content of the sentence "if anyone invented the wheel, then Gorg did" is actually "if anyone invented the wheel, then the guy who invented the wheel did". But, this is trivial knowledge that most people can have simply be reflection.
Finally, some people might think that although we can introduce a proper name with a description, we cannot have thoughts about the thing so named. This view breaks the connection between possessing a proper name and being able to have a thought about the thing named. (I believe this is Salmon's view).
These are some of the ways out of our puzzle of easy knowledge. But there are a few people out there who think the best option is simply to accept that we have such easy knowledge. (Some of us might even be attracted to such a view). Part of the job for these people is to explain why it isn't so bad to have such easy knowledge. But, their job is made even more difficult by the following fact. It seems that we are not able to act on knowledge such easy knowledge and yet knowledge that is acquired in the traditional way can typically be acted upon.
To make this problem more acute, let's focus on an example. Suppose that Ned the navigator is a man who is extremely good at getting to places given the appropriate information. In fact, he boasts that he can take anyone to any coordinate on Earth. However, Ned is also a philosopher and he introduces a name for the coordinates of the oldest tree in Washington state by saying "Let 'L' be a proper name for the coordinates of the oldest tree in Washington state". then, through a simple series of justified inferences he comes to know that if there is a location of the oldest tree in Washington state, then it is at L. Fred the navigator, on the other hand, has the same navigational abilities as Ned, but looks up the location of the oldest tree in Washington state in an encylopedia. Fred knows that if there is a location of the oldest tree in Washington state, then it is 48 degrees north by 124 degrees west. Now, since 'L' is a proper name for the location of the oldest tree in Washington state and since that location is 48 degrees north by 124 degrees west, it turns out that Ned and Fred know the exact same thing. Yet, if I were to ask to takes to the location of the oldest tree in Washington state, Ned wouldn't be able to take me there whereas Fred would. This seems like a difference that needs to be explained.
I take it that there are a couple of explanations available to the Millian who accepts easy knowledge. First, He can say that although we can have easy knowledge it is not usefull because there is some difference between the easy knowledge and regular knowledge. such a Millian would be required to explain what that difference is.
On the other hand, a Millian might simply say that we are looking for explanations in the wrong direction. He might simply say that the difference between easy knowledge and regulary knowledge lies in the fact that we have abilities to act on regular knowledge that we lack with mere easy knowledge. That is to say that knowledge is easy in virtue of the fact that we cannot act on it.
Finally, a Millian might simply reject explanations at this point and say that although there is a correlation between having abilities and having knowledge that is acquired in the traditional way, such a correlation need not be explained.
I think the first option is the way to go. I will quickly argue against each of the other two options and then explain how one might flesh out the first option in more detail. the Final option is not good because such a correlation will be a strong, perhaps necessary connection. It is hard to imagine, for example, a world in which most people's knowledge comes by way of naming and yet they are still able to act on that knowledge. It is hard to imagine, for example, a world in which Ned does exactly what he does in our actual world to come to know the location of the oldest tree in Washington and yet takes us right to the tree when we ask. Even if he did so, we would simply say that he was lucky in his guess.
The second option seems weird. It seems like easy knowledge is easy knowledge in virtue of the way it is acquired rather than in virtue of any correlation between our lack of abilities. Moreover, it seems intuitively plausible to say that there is a difference between Fred and Ned's knowledge that accounts for their differences in ability. This all leads me to believe that the first option is the one that a Millian who accepts easy knowledge should take.
Here is what such a Millian can say: Although Fred and Ned know the same things, Fred has an ability the Ned lacks because his knowledge is had under an appropriate guise or way of believing. Ned knows the location of the oldest tree in a particular way. He knows navigational facts in one way and the fact about the location of the oldest tree in another. So, he is not able to connect up those bits of knowledge and act appropriately. On the other hand, Fred's navigational knowledge and knowledge about the location of the oldest tree are had in the same way. So, he is able to connect up those bits of knowledge and act appropriately. So, it seems to me that the deflationist solution to the problem of easy knowledge is best when combined with an endorsement of Ways Millianism.
posted by Joshua at 2:16 PM
4 Comments:
I of course completely agree. Note that if Hawthorne/Stanley are right, then so-called easy knowledge doesn't meet the stricture (charitably read) that knowledge must be available as a premise in practical reasoning. So if H/S are right about what it takes to have knowledge, easy knowledge is not knowledge because it doesn't meet one of the conditions. I don't think they're right, in part because one and the same proposition could both be available for use as a premise in practical reasoning when entertained one way and not when entertained another way. We could take a weak reading of the stricture and rule such a proposition as known (according to H/S). But I think this would water down their intended account too much. I prefer to think they're on to something, but not knowledge. What they're on to is maybe regular knowledge. Easy knowledge is weird precisely because it's not regular knowledge; it can't be integrated with other beliefs/knowledge and desires to produce action in the normal way. And this in turn is because of the way in which it is entertained.
Another deflater is to note that part of what makes us uncomfortable about easy knowledge, I think, is that we're after more than mere knowledge when we inquire, but we're often not explicit about this. If someone asks me where the tallest tree in Washington is, I can answer the question (knowledgeably!) but won't satisfy the questioner. This is in part because typically one won't just want to know where it is, but also how to get to it, whether the new construction plan involves its destruction, etc. You don't get this other information by easy knowledge. But that doesn't make easy knowledge not knowledge.
One sticking point in arguing for our conclusion is the popularity of an "acquaintance" response. One can refute particular proposals but there seems to be a widely shared feeling that *something* along the lines of acquaintance must be right. Does anyone have any thoughts on that?
Hi Chris,
I think what you are saying in your first paragraph sounds right to me. Would you say something like the following is true: S knows that P (in the regular way) iff S knows P in a way that is useful in practical reasoning? I think something like this sounds right to me and it fits with my view that practical rationality (just like epistemic rationality) is a kind of rationality that is grounded in the ways. That is, you are practically rational in doing A iff doing A is supported by your evidence (and desires) under some way or other.
I like what you say in your second paragraph. But, I have a worry. I have a slight attraction to something like David's view concerning knowledge-wh. If we extend what David says about knowing who to other instances of knowledge-wh, then we might say that someone knows how to phi iff s knows an answer to the question "how do you phi?". But, it seems that we can have easy knowledge answers to questions in the same way we can have easy knowledge. So, there is a problem of easy knowledge-wh.
Here are two solutions to that problem. First, we can accept that there is easy knowledge-wh and differentiate it from regular knowledge-wh by invoking ways. Unfortunately, I find this more counter-intuitive than the analogous solution for easy knowledge outlined in the main post.
Second, we might say that someone knows how to phi iff he knows an answer to the question "how do you phi" and knows it in a way that is useful in practical reasoning. I kind of like this view better than the view expressed above.
Unfortunately, if one were to accept the slightly attractive second option above, then one would have a theoretically non-uniform account. This is because (roughly) one would think that somethings being useful in practical reasoning is not a requirement for knowledge, it is a requirement for knowledge-wh. This combination of views gets some things intuitively right and gets some others pretty drastically intuitively wrong. Probably, it should be rejected, but it has an initial appeal.
I don't know what to say to those who think there is an acquaintance requirement on certain kinds of knowledge. I guess I worry that such a requirement will result in problems for knowledge of abstract claims such as 2+2=4. This is because one might think that however we spell out acquaintance, we'll rule out acquaintance to numbers.
I am sorry to say that I don't have any systematic account of why acquaintance is not a requirement for knowledge.
Okay, now I hope you don't think awfully of me, but I am beginning to be attracted to something like the Hawthorne/Stanley position.
Let's let JTB be a three place relation that bears between an individual, a proposition and a way or guise. We can say that someone, S, has a justified true (non-gettierized) belief that P just in case S stands in the JTB relation to a proposition under some guise or other. Further we can say that S knows that P just in case S stands in the JTB relation to P under some guise or other and that belief can be used under that guise as "a premise in practical reasoning".
Now, we have gotten rid of the problem of easy knowledge. Ned the navigator does not justifiably believe the truth that that the oldest tree in Washington is at L under a guise that can be used in practical reasoning. (Although he does justifiably believe that truth). So, he does not know that the oldest tree in Washington is at L.
Moreover, we can still connect up knowledge-wh to knowledge-that by saying things like "S knows where x is just in case S knows an answer to the question 'where is x?'". Since we got rid of the problem of easy knowledge, we don't have a problem of easy knowledge-wh.
This solution hooks up with our intuition that you can't have easy knowledge. It also hooks up with our intuitions about when a person knows-wh. It might also fit better with our ordinary use of the word 'knows'. Moreover, it does not invoke the weird acquaintance relation.
One thing that is slightly counter-intuitive is that even though Ned introduced the name 'L' by saying "let 'L' name the location of the oldest tree in Washington" and even though he can easily reason his way to the conclusion that the location of the oldest tree in Washington is at L, he does not know this. He has a justified true (non-gettier) belief because he JTBs that proposition under some guise or other. But, he doesn't know that proposition because he can't use that justified true belief as a premise in practical reasoning.
I kind of like this view. Does anyone see anything immediately wrong with it or does anyone have a suggested amendment?
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