The Gunk Question
It may be that we have talked about this question here before. I don't remember for sure. But, I am wondering if anyone has asked the following question:
Necessarily, for any x, x is a hunk of gunk iff _______?
I take it that one popular view might be the following:
Necessarily, for any x, x is a hunk of gunk iff x occupies a region that contains no points.
This view has a number of problems. One problem is with the possibility of tile space. One might think that an object that occupies a single tile region is a simple. But, since tile regions contain no points, such an object would be counted as gunk on the view above. So, it seems that there is some reason to believe that the view above is false.
Perhaps a more pressing problem is the following. Many of us reject liberal views of decomposition according to which any subregion of a region occupied by an object contains a part of that object. But, if we are inclined to reject such a view, then we are probably also inclined to reject the view above.
So, I am wondering what kind of answer someone might give to the gunk question that fits well with a rejection of the liberal view of decomposition. And, I am also wondering what kind of answer someone might give if that person is inclined to accept that possibility of tile space.
posted by Joshua at 4:19 PM
4 Comments:
I take it we're looking for non-mereological answers, right?
So something like...
X is a hunk of gunk iff X has proper parts and all of Xs parts have proper parts
is out of the question
Yes, we are looking for non-mereological conditions.
Hi Joshua,
As far as I know, no one has talked about this question before, but I'm not sure whether that's right.
There seems to be an obvious solution to the problem concerning tile regions you mention; in particular, the view could be modified as follows:
Necessarily, for any x, x is a hunk of gunk iff x occupies a region each of whose subregions has proper subregions.
One complaint someone might have about this is that it violates the constraint that answers to the question be non-mereological, since subregionhood just is parthood restricted to regions. But I can envisage at least a few plausible responses to this complaint. An obvious response is to one deny the claim that subregionhood just is restricted parthood. Alternatively, one might say that although subregionhood just is restricted proper parthood, that's no problem. After all, I take it that the quantifier in the Gunk Question, like the quantifiers in the Special Composition Question and in the Simple Question, is intended to be restricted to material objects. If so, it seems plausible that the non-mereological constraint should be that answers to the question not involve mereological notions, where those notions are restricted to material objects. And regions, of course, aren't material objects.
On the other hand, the modified answer to the Gunk Question that I suggested above still does not fit well with a rejection of the liberal view of decomposition (nor, by the way, with an acceptance of the possibility of extended simples that occupy gunky regions--which possibility doesn't only fail to fit well with the modified answer, but positively entails that it is false).
A final point: I can't think of answer to the Gunk Question that I find plausible, suggesting a Brutal View of Gunk. I wonder whether this can be used to motivate brutal answers to SCQ and SQ as well.
Hey Greg,
I do worry that the suggested answer to the gunk question violates the constraint that answers should be stated with non-mereological vocabulary. However, if this is a genuine worry, then shouldn't also be a worry for MaxCon. After all, the full statement of MaxCon will involve definitions that employ the notion of a subregion as well. So, it seems to me that the constraint is violated by your suggested answer to the gunk question only if it is violated by Markosian's answer to the simple question.
When I first started thinking of the gunk question I thought that I might be inclined toward a brutal view of gunk. I also wondered whether that should incline me toward a brutal view of simples. I think the answer, though, is not as straightforward as one might hope. Suppose that God tells us that if there is are correct answers to SQ and GQ, then they are occupancy accounts according to which the concept in question is linked to the concept of spatial occupancy in some way (Like MaxCon or PV). At this point we might decide that the pointy view of simples is correct, but still be inclined to a brutal view of gunk (perhaps because we worry about decomposition issues). Similarly, we might decide that unrestricted composition is the correct answer to the SCQ but hold a brutal view of gunk.
I am beginning to wonder though if a brutal view of gunk is entailed by a brutal view of decomposition. similarly, one a brutal view of junk (something such that any thing it is a proper part of is a proper part of something else) might be entailed by a brutal view of composition. If these entailments hold, then they are very interesting entailments. What is also interesting is that a brutal view of decomposition is consistent with a non-brutal view of simples. I wonder if a brutal view of composition is consistent with a non-brutal view of Completors (things that are such that they are not proper parts of anything) (I couldn't think of a better name (suggestions are welcome))
In any case, I think these are interesting questions worth investigating.
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