Agency Question
Some composite things are agents and some are not. For example, I am an agent but a rock is not (unless it is rock*). One might wonder what features distinguish the agents from the non-agents. Although this is an interesting question, I will not be pursuing that question in this post. Instead I want to consider what might be called derivative agency. Consider the Supreme Court. That entity has some kind of agency; it makes decisions and is morally blameworthy for some of those decisions. It has what we might call derivative agency. However, consider the fusion of me and all the furniture in my office. That thing does not make decisions and is not morally blameworthy for anything. It does not have derivative agency. But, what exactly is the difference between the Supreme Court and the fusion of me and all the furniture in my room?
Here is one thought: Perhaps it is because the Supreme Court completely decomposes into agents that it has derivative agency. The fusion of me and all the furniture in my office, however, does not completely decompose into agents. So, that is why it does not have agency.
Although perhaps appealing, I don't think this initial thought is right. For we can consider the thing that happens to be composed of me and some alien millions of light-years away. It does not seem to me that that latter thing has derivative agency and yet it (just like the Supreme Court) completely decomposes into agents.
Here is a second idea. Perhaps the Supreme Court essentially decomposes into agents whereas the thing that happens to be composed of me and that distant alien does not. If agents, derivative or otherwise, are essentially agents and derivative agents completely decompose into agents, then we can say that the Supreme Court is a derivative agent whereas the thing that happens to be composed of me and the alien is not. We can say that this is the case because the Supreme Court could not have failed to be composed of agents whereas the thing composed of me and the alien could have failed to be composed of agents (it might have had me and the alien and an extra particle as a part).
Here is one thought: Perhaps it is because the Supreme Court completely decomposes into agents that it has derivative agency. The fusion of me and all the furniture in my office, however, does not completely decompose into agents. So, that is why it does not have agency.
Although perhaps appealing, I don't think this initial thought is right. For we can consider the thing that happens to be composed of me and some alien millions of light-years away. It does not seem to me that that latter thing has derivative agency and yet it (just like the Supreme Court) completely decomposes into agents.
Here is a second idea. Perhaps the Supreme Court essentially decomposes into agents whereas the thing that happens to be composed of me and that distant alien does not. If agents, derivative or otherwise, are essentially agents and derivative agents completely decompose into agents, then we can say that the Supreme Court is a derivative agent whereas the thing that happens to be composed of me and the alien is not. We can say that this is the case because the Supreme Court could not have failed to be composed of agents whereas the thing composed of me and the alien could have failed to be composed of agents (it might have had me and the alien and an extra particle as a part).
posted by Joshua at 4:04 PM
5 Comments:
Hi Joshua,
I think that this is a really interesting topic. Sara Rachel Chant has also done some nice, relevant work on collective agency (see esp. her "The Special Composition Question In Action", PPQ).
Some reflections:
There are two ways to understand your question. On one hand, there is the question of what is the property had by the Supreme Court yet lacked by the fusion of you and the alien such that, in virtue of having that property, the Supreme Court enjoys derivative agency. Since I'm not witty enough at the moment to come up with a better name, let's just call it The First Question.
On the other hand, the The Second Question simply asks for a property had by the Supreme Court yet lacked by the fusion of you and the alien such that having that property is necessary for enjoying derivative agency.
Now, it must be that you're attempting to answer the Second Question, not the First Question. For even if it's the case that every derivative agent is essentially decomposable into (non-derivative?) agents, that's being the case does not explain why some composite object is derivative agent. It's too not hard to think of composite objects that are essentially decomposable into agents and yet not themselves derivative agents (for example, the fusion of all New York City taxi drivers).
So you must be answering the First Question. But it that's the case, the first view you consider is as good an answer as the first. Necessarily, anything that is essentially decomposable into some Fs is just plain decomposable into some Fs; thus, if being essentially decomposable into agents is a necessary condition for derivative agency, then so is just plain being decomposable into agents.
Typo: The first sentence of the last paragraph should read "So you must be answering the First Question. But it that's the case, the first view you consider is as good an answer as the second.
One more thought: It's not clear to me that the Supreme Court essentially decomposes into agents. Suppose that Justice John Paul Stevens slips into a coma that's long enough to raise doubts about his agency but short enough to not warrant his removal from the bench.
Is this a case in which the Supreme Court does not completely decompose into agents? I don't know. I guess that depends upon whether the Supreme Court must completely decompose into agents at every time it exists (perhaps we only need to say that this needs to be the case at some times), as well as whether comatose humans are still agents.
Just a thought. On a completely different note: any of you planning to be at the Eastern APA this year? It'd be fun to chat in person.
Ack: The typo correction has a typo. I meant the Second Question.
I love the end of the semester...
Hi Alex,
Thank you for the comments and the recommended reading. I'll look up that paper today and take a look at it.
I agree that the first view I consider is as good of an answer to the first question as the second view I consider. However, I think I was considering something more like the first question. I think the fusion of all New York taxi drivers is more like the fusion of me and the alien than it is like the Supreme Court. Even though each taxi driver is essentially an agent, it may be that the thing that happens to be composed of those taxi drivers is not. that thing might have had something in addition to those taxi drivers as a part.
Here are two examples that might show that the thing composed of all the taxi drivers might not have completely decomposed into non-derivative agents. Suppose that one of the taxi drivers has his finger cut off in an accident. If that happens, then the finger is no longer a part of the taxi driver (or any other taxi driver) yet it might still be a part of the thing that was (before the accident) composed of all the taxi drivers. But, if that composite object does not completely decompose into agents after the finger has been cut off, then it does not essentially decompose into agents.
Here is another example. Someone might think that the thing that happens to be composed of taxi drivers might continue to exist after one of those drivers dies. Moreover, one might think that that composite object will have the corpse of the taxi driver as a part. But, if that is the case, then, again, it does not essentially decompose into agents.
However, I am inclined to think that the Supreme Court is a very different kind of composite object (see Uzquiano's "The Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Justices" paper). I am inclined to think that the Supreme Court must be composed of agents. If one of the members of the Supreme court loses a finger, then that finger is not a part of the Supreme Court. Moreover, if one of the members of the supreme court dies, then he is no longer part of the Supreme Court.
I do worry, though, about your coma case. It does seem that Stevens would be a member of the Supreme Court even during a brief coma that undermines his agency. I'll have to think about that case a bit.
Also, I will be at the Eastern APA this month and I do think it would be fun to get together and chat. Let's make a plan of some kind.
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