McDowell's Argument
Williamson criticises Mcdowell's argument for the conclusion that the things one can mean or think just are the things that are (or might be) the case. I don't quite understand how this thesis is supposed to fit into the broader picture that Williamson is criticising (perhaps someone help me understand that), but it seems to me that Williamson's criticisms are mistaken. Here is Mcdowell's argument:
1. When we think truly, what we think is what is the case.
2. The world is everything that is the case.
3. So, when we think truly, what we think is the world.
I think that this argument is rather confusing. But, Williamson seems to suggest that (1) is false. Many things about this argument confuse me, but the truth of (1) is not one of them (at least on the charitable readings of (1)). Williamson's objections to (1) have to do with the claim that (A) the content of our thoughts are fine grained whereas (B) the things that are the case are not. So, for example, Williamson says that what we think when we think that Hesperus is hot is different from what we think when we think that Phosphorus is hot. But, what is true when Phosphorus is hot is the same thing that is true when Hesperus is hot. So, that which is the case is different from what is thought.
It seems to me that there are two options here. Either some broadly Fregean-like thesis is true or it is not. That is, either the thought that Hesperus is hot is the same as the thought that Phosphorus is hot or it is not. If it is, then it seems that there are two different things that are true. Namely that Hesperus is hot and that Phosphorus is hot. That is, there are two different things that are the case: that Hesperus is hot and that Phosphorus is hot. This commits us to the claim that what is the case is not merely an object's having a property. Rather what is the case is a complex entity made up out of fregean senses. In other words, the very same fregean proposition that is believed is also the thing that is the case. This indicates that (B) is mistaken.
On the other hand, if the broadly Fregean thesis is false, then the thought that Hesperus is hot is the same as the thought that Phosphorus is hot. But, this indicates that (A) is mistaken.
Williamson admits that there are various ways to take McDowell's claims, some of which will make the argument go through and others of which will not. However, Williamson also claims that the weaker readings will not bear the weight of the arguments McDowell puts on them. Of course, I don't know exactly what McDowell hopes to accomplish and how it fits into the broader picture that Williamon is criticising. So, for all I know, Williamson is right. But, I wish I understood this section of the chapter better enough to know whether he is right and to know why he is right.
I also have a couple of questions/complaints about Williamson's objection involving elusive objects. Williamson says that McDowell's argument relies on the thesis that everything is thinkable. He then suggests that we have no reason to think that there are no elusive objects (objects which are not individually thinkable). Suppose Williamson is right that we have no reason to think that there are no elusive objects. If that is true, does it really hurt McDowell. Can't McDowell make his point (whatever it may be) with the thesis that everything is either individually or collectively thinkable. If McDowell's argument requires only this weaker thesis, then Williamson's criticism is no good.
Finally, I am skeptical of the claim that we have no reason to believe that there are no elusive objects that are not also enigmas (objects which cannot be thought of either individually or collectively). Here is an argument that relies on several conroversial claims, but which I think may be sound. Suppose that arbitrary naming really does result in a particular object being named and that we can think of an object when we have a name for it. Now, if some objects can be thought of collectively, then we can name any one of them by saying "let 'Fred' name an arbitrarily chosen object from amongst those that we can think of collectively". Once we have the name 'Fred' we can think about whichever object was named. But, since any one of the objects could have been named, any one of the objects can be thought of individually. So, any objects that can be collectively thought of can also be individually thought of. So, any elusive objects must also be enigmas.
1. When we think truly, what we think is what is the case.
2. The world is everything that is the case.
3. So, when we think truly, what we think is the world.
I think that this argument is rather confusing. But, Williamson seems to suggest that (1) is false. Many things about this argument confuse me, but the truth of (1) is not one of them (at least on the charitable readings of (1)). Williamson's objections to (1) have to do with the claim that (A) the content of our thoughts are fine grained whereas (B) the things that are the case are not. So, for example, Williamson says that what we think when we think that Hesperus is hot is different from what we think when we think that Phosphorus is hot. But, what is true when Phosphorus is hot is the same thing that is true when Hesperus is hot. So, that which is the case is different from what is thought.
It seems to me that there are two options here. Either some broadly Fregean-like thesis is true or it is not. That is, either the thought that Hesperus is hot is the same as the thought that Phosphorus is hot or it is not. If it is, then it seems that there are two different things that are true. Namely that Hesperus is hot and that Phosphorus is hot. That is, there are two different things that are the case: that Hesperus is hot and that Phosphorus is hot. This commits us to the claim that what is the case is not merely an object's having a property. Rather what is the case is a complex entity made up out of fregean senses. In other words, the very same fregean proposition that is believed is also the thing that is the case. This indicates that (B) is mistaken.
On the other hand, if the broadly Fregean thesis is false, then the thought that Hesperus is hot is the same as the thought that Phosphorus is hot. But, this indicates that (A) is mistaken.
Williamson admits that there are various ways to take McDowell's claims, some of which will make the argument go through and others of which will not. However, Williamson also claims that the weaker readings will not bear the weight of the arguments McDowell puts on them. Of course, I don't know exactly what McDowell hopes to accomplish and how it fits into the broader picture that Williamon is criticising. So, for all I know, Williamson is right. But, I wish I understood this section of the chapter better enough to know whether he is right and to know why he is right.
I also have a couple of questions/complaints about Williamson's objection involving elusive objects. Williamson says that McDowell's argument relies on the thesis that everything is thinkable. He then suggests that we have no reason to think that there are no elusive objects (objects which are not individually thinkable). Suppose Williamson is right that we have no reason to think that there are no elusive objects. If that is true, does it really hurt McDowell. Can't McDowell make his point (whatever it may be) with the thesis that everything is either individually or collectively thinkable. If McDowell's argument requires only this weaker thesis, then Williamson's criticism is no good.
Finally, I am skeptical of the claim that we have no reason to believe that there are no elusive objects that are not also enigmas (objects which cannot be thought of either individually or collectively). Here is an argument that relies on several conroversial claims, but which I think may be sound. Suppose that arbitrary naming really does result in a particular object being named and that we can think of an object when we have a name for it. Now, if some objects can be thought of collectively, then we can name any one of them by saying "let 'Fred' name an arbitrarily chosen object from amongst those that we can think of collectively". Once we have the name 'Fred' we can think about whichever object was named. But, since any one of the objects could have been named, any one of the objects can be thought of individually. So, any objects that can be collectively thought of can also be individually thought of. So, any elusive objects must also be enigmas.
posted by Joshua at 5:55 PM
6 Comments:
Joshua,
I feel like I may be missing the point. I'm inclined, though, to agree with Williamson. I think propositions are more fine-grained than the states of affairs that function as their truthmakers. Armstrong (2004) argues for such a view, one in which there is no one-to-one correspondence between truths and truthmakers. It's a many-many relation. I think he is correct.
If when we think truly we think that a proposition P is true, and, if the world is everything that makes some proposition P true (the totality of truthmakers), then we should not accept McDowell's argument. What is the case is narrower than what is thought truly.
I suppose this is trivial. Think about P, P&P, P&P&P&P...........
One state of affairs is sufficient as a truthmaker for infinitely many propositions.
Hi Christian,
As far as I could tell, McDowell and Williamson were not talking about truth makers. They were just talking about whatever kind of thing is the case and whatever kind of thing is thought. I think that what we think and what is the case are the very same thing. After all, it seems like we can truly say that whatever Fred thinks is true. But, that indicates that the bearer of truth (or the things that are the case) are the same kinds of things as those that are thought.
Now, I do think there is a gap between what our representation of the world and the world itself. I think that this is the main idea that Williamson wants to use in his objection. But, I don't see how the objection works partly because I don't understand what is being objected to.
Hi Joshua,
That is, either the thought that Hesperus is hot is the same as the thought that Phosphorus is hot or it is not. If it is, then it seems that there are two different things that are true. Namely that Hesperus is hot and that Phosphorus is hot. That is, there are two different things that are the case: that Hesperus is hot and that Phosphorus is hot.
Let me step back. I'm having some trouble with the quote above. I would have thought that, if Hesperus is hot is the very same thought as that Phosphorus is hot, then there is not two different things that are true, but only one. Is that just a typo or am I misunderstanding?
I'm supposing it is a typo and that these thoughts are different, and that the explanation of their difference involves an appeal to a Fregean sense. You then go on to say,
This commits us to the claim that what is the case is not merely an object's having a property. Rather what is the case is a complex entity made up out of fregean senses. In other words, the very same fregean proposition that is believed is also the thing that is the case. This indicates that (B) is mistaken.
Why can't we say that accepting Fregean senses does not commit us to the claim that what is the case is merely an object's having a property (or standing in some relation)? This is what I meant by 'what is the case' being a truthmaker. On this view, the sense is not part of the proposition and so, no sense-like thing is needed as part of the truthmaker (what is the case). Rather, a sense is a way a proposition is grasped. So, what is thought is the same when one thinks that Hesperus is hot and Phosphorus is hot, but that which is thought is thought about in a different way, thus explaining the differing cognitive significance between them. If this is right, then perhaps it reveals an ambiguity in the expression 'what is thought truly'. It can refer to the content alone, or instead, it can refer to the content and the way it is presented to the thinker.
Hi All,
Sorry for being late to the party. I thought Williamson was fairly explicit that he was using 'thought' to stand for what Rochesterians would call 'ways of believing'. If that's right, his point about thoughts is uncontroversial.
I feel like the dialectic surrounding Williamson's discussion of McDowell's argument goes something like this.
According to those who endorse the conceptual turn, the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought. But then Williamson points out that lots of philosophers seem to be doing more than just conceptual philosophy because our concepts only constitute a small fraction of reality. And then he responds to a couple of objections according to which even those philosophers who look like they are doing more than conceptual philosophy really aren't doing anything more than that -- and McDowell's argument is one of these objections. So if Williamson can successfully respond to McDowell's argument, then he will have at least helped to support one of his main theses, namely that not all philosophy is conceptual philosophy. We've moved beyond the conceptual turn.
As I understand him, McDowell is saying that to analyze the structure of thought JUST IS to analyze the structure of the world, given the tight relationship between the content of our thoughts and worldly facts of the matter. Williamson had said that according to conceptual philosophy, the goal of philosophy was to analyze the structure of thought, and then Williamson objected by saying surely there are lots of things for philosophy to analyze besides that. McDowell says that philosophy analyzes all those other things by analyzing the structure of thought, so Williamson's argument against conceptual philosophy isn't a good one.
Not sure if that helps.
I think it is right that Williamson is using 'thought' to refer to some kind of representational entity that is distinct from whatever is true. However, I am not sure that is a legitimate interpretation of 'what we think' in McDowell's argument.
Part of the reason I am unsure about whether it provides a legitimate interpretation of McDowell's argument is that I am not exactly sure what the linguistic or conceptual turn is supposed to be.
Here is another way to put my point. McDowell talks about thought and about truth. But there are several different views that people have held about these things:
1. Thoughts are Fregean entities composed of senses and those are the bearers of truth values.
2. Thoughts are Fregean entities composed of senses and something else is the bearer of truth values.
3. Thoughts are non-Fregean representational structures (ways of believing) and those thoughts are not the bearers of truth values.
4. Thoughts are non-Fregean entities that are not composed of senses and that are the primary bearers of truth value (Russellian propositions perhaps).
There are other combinations of views, but these ones have had significant adherents. As I see it, if (1) or (4) is true, then McDowell is right that there is no gap between true thought and truth. However, if (2) or (3) is right, then McDowell is mistaken. What I am unclear about is whether the philosopher who defends conceptual philosophy is committed to any of these pictures.
Perhaps Williamson wants to say something along these lines: If a view like (2) or (3) is true, then conceptual philosophy is just mistaken in saying that philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought. However, if (1) or (4) is true, the although the conceptual philosopher is right to say that philosophy is the analysis of the structure of though, this thesis turns out to be not very interesting.
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