Quick Question
Can anyone think of a non-intentional property that any two entities possibly instantiate, but no two entities necessarily co-instantiate?
I also want to assume that there are some necessarily existing entities, in particular I want to assume that there are propositions and that propositions necessarily exist.
UPDATE:
I'd like to revise my question. What I need is a propositional schema that is such that for any entity it is possibly true of that entity and there are no two entities that are such that necessarily the propositional schema is true of the first entity iff it is true of the second entity.
Same assumptions as before.
posted by Joshua at 9:45 AM
3 Comments:
Hi Joshua,
Perhaps this isn't what you want, exactly. But what about 'x is lonely' (which some object a satisfies iff there are no contingently existing, concrete individuals wholly distinct from a).
Presumably, any object could have been lonely. But necessarily, there are no two objects such that necessarily, the one is lonely iff the other is. (I'm assuming you mean no two distinct objects)
I meant to preview the last comment, not post it! Please disregard; it's mistaken. (For any two propositions, necessarily, the one is lonely iff the other is.)
Yeah, those propositions are causing problems. I am beginning to give up on this quest. I had one thought (though it might be too mental intentionastic-y). My idea was to use a robust Platonist view of fictions to help out. Perhaps everything is such that there is a fiction just about it. But, I still haven't figured out how to use this fact to my advantage. I was thinking that we might be able to pair up fictions and worlds. Here are a couple of options.
(1) Fiction F is paired with world W iff the things that exist according to F exist in W.
(2) Fiction F' is paired with world W' iff the things that exist according to F do not exist in W.
There are other pairings as well, but I'm not sure how to use this idea to help out with my problem.
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