Sider on Intrinsicality

A few years ago, Sider argued against Lewis's second account of intrinsicality and in favor of Lewis's first account. In this post, I will do the following. First, I will present Lewis's two accounts of intrinsicality (I will assume the doctrine of world bound individuals in my presentation, but that is simply to make things simpler). Second, I will present Sider's objection to Lewis's second account. Third, I will suggest an amendment to Lewis's second account. And finally, I will present my own objections to Lewis's first account.

Lewis First Account of intrinsicality says that a property is intrinsic just in case it never differs between duplicates (where two things are duplicates just in case there is a one-one correspondence between their parts that preserves perfectly natural properties). Intuitively, if something looks just like me and has all the same perfectly natural properties that I have, then that thing has all the intrinsic properties that I have.

Lewis's second account starts with the notion of a lonely object. A lonely object is one that exists alone in a possible world. A property is independent of loneliness just in case (i) it is had by a lonely object, (ii) it is lacked by a lonely object, (iii) it is had by a non-lonely object, and (iv) it is lacked by a non-lonely object. Finally, Lewis's Second Account says that a property is intrinsic just in case it is both independent of loneliness and non-disjunctive.

Sider seems to favor Lewis first account over his second. Sider argues that there are counterexamples to the second account which are not also counterexamples to the first account. His counterexamples rely on the notion of maximality. A property F is maximal just in case (roughly) large parts of an F thing are not themselves Fs. Some refinements need to be made to this notion, but let's ignore those for now. According to Sider, being a rock is a maximal property because large parts of rocks are not themselves rocks. Similarly, being a house is a maximal property because large parts of houses are not themselves houses. Sider also claims that maximal properties are not intrinsic. This is because whether or not something has a maximal property will depend on whether it is a large part of something that has that maximal property. For example, something is not a house if it is a large part of a house; all of a house except one of its windows is not a house because that thing is a large part of a house. Since the exemplification of these maximal features by an object depends on what is going on outside the borders of that object, they are not intrinsic.

Now Sider's argument is as follows:
1. If Lewis's second account is true, then being a rock is intrinsic.
2. But, being a rock is not intrinsic.
3. So, Lewis's second account is not true.

The justification for (2) is in the paragraph above. The justification for (1) is as follows. Being a rock is not a disjunctive property. Moreover, being a rock is had by a lonely object and lacked by a lonely object (there are lonely rocks and lonely non-rocks). And also, being a rock is had by a non-lonely object and lacked by a non-lonely object (simple empirical investigation will verify this). So, according to Lewis's second account, being a rock is intrinsic. So, (1) is true.

Sider notes that a similar problem does not arise for the first account of intrinsicality. There could be a duplicate of a rock that is embedded in a larger rock. That duplicate is not a rock. So, bieng a rock is not shared by these two duplicates and hence is not intrinsic (according to the first account).

I like Sider's argument. I guess I think it is sound. However, I think a simple amendment to the second account will save it from this sort of objection. I wish I could say that a property F is intrinsic just in case it is (i) independent of loneliness, (ii) non-disjunctive and (iii) non-maximal. But, this is not quite right. Sider points out that it is not maximality that is troublesome but rather border sensitivity. Sider says that a property is border-sensitive iff "whether it is instantiated by an object depends on what is going on, intrinsically, outside that object at its border." All border sensitive properties are non-intrinsic and some are not maximal. This led me to think that the following account might be true: a property F is intrinsic just in case it is (i) independent of loneliness, (ii) non-disjunctive and (iii) non-border-sensitive. But, unfortunately, because of the occurrence of 'intrinsic' in the definition of 'border-sensitive' this account is circular. So, let's introduce a new notion. Let's say that a property is outwardly-sensitive just in case whether it is instantiated by an object depends on what is going on outside that object (at its border) (I'm not sure if this last little parenthetical bit is needed). If a property is outwardly-sensitive, then it is border-sensitive. Now we can say the following:

Lewis's Amended Second Account: a property F is intrinsic just in case it is (i) independent of loneliness, (ii) non-disjunctive and (iii) not outwardly-sensitive.

I kind of like this account. Question: are there any immediate problems with this account?

Now, I'd like to suggest that there are counter-examples to Lewis's first account which are not also counterexamples to Lewis's Amended Second Account. First, if Lewis's First Account is true, then being identical to Joshua is not an intrinsic property. This is because some duplicates of me are not identical to me. But, it is an intrinsic property. So, Lewis's First Account if false. Second, if Lewis First Account if true, then co-existing with the number 2 is an intrinsic property. This is because the number 2 is a necessary existent and no two duplicates fail to co-exist with it. But, co-existing with the number 2 is not intrinsic (at least it is not intrinsic to me). So, Lewis's First Account is false.

I like these two arguments, though, I do not think they are knock-down. David, for example, has suggested a problem for the first argument. I am not sure what I think of the problem that he suggests. But, it is interesting to note that the Amended Second Account is not so obviously subject to these counterexamples. First, as long as you do not endorse certain kinds of essentialism, we can maintain that being identical to Joshua is independent of loneliness. It is also clear that co-existing with the number 2 is not independent of loneliness.

There is a worry that I have, though. It seems that co-existing with the number 2 is an extrinsic property of me and an intrinsic property of the number 2 (thanks to Rock* for pointing out this worry). I am not sure how to amend the account further to get this result. I can make the following amendment. First, call W2 a subtraction of a world W1 iff W2 is either possible or impossible and it is just like the W1 except that something that exists in the W1 does not exist in W2. Now we can say that a lonely object* is one that exists alone in a possible world or alone in a subtraction of a possible world. We might be able to give a disjunctive account of intrinsicality where we use the notion of loneliness for contingent things and the notion of loneliness* for non-contingent things. I am not sure how this will work out. I'd prefer to come up with an account of F is intrinsic to x and wed the notion of intrinsicality to objects. I'm sorry this post has gotten a little messy toward the end, but I am still thinking through these things. If anyone has any ideas, please let me know what you think.

The meanings of definite descriptions

Nathan Salmon has recently written a paper on that very confusing passage from Russell's 'On Denoting'. Salmon's paper appears in a special issue of Mind. I have not read his paper but I have talked to Rock* about it. In this post, I am going to present an argument that is inspired by my discussions with Rock* about Salmon's paper. I do not claim that that my formulation of the argument below is a decent formulation of the argument presented in Salmon's paper (I am not even sure if it is a formulation of Salmon's argument at all). But, I think it is interesting anyway.

Let's consider the definite description "The center of mass of Earth". The unit meaning of "The center of mass of Earth" is the meaning of that whole phrase which built out of the meanings of words in that phrase, if there is such a meaning. I am inclined to think that there is a unit meaning of "The center of mass of Earth". But, the argument that I present below is supposed to show that there is not such a unit meaning.

Let's also introduce a principle of naive compositionality. I am never sure about how to formulate compositionality principles. Roughly, we want to say that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of the words that make up that sentence and their order. Here is an attempt to make something like that principle more precise.

Naive Compositionality Principle: If S1 and S2 are made up of some phrases that can be put in a one-one correspondence that preserves their individual meanings and their order in the sentence, then S1 and S2 express the same proposition.

Here is an example of how this principle should work. Consider the following two sentences:

S1. All bachelors are unmarried.

S1. All unmarried adult males are unmarried.

Sentence (S1) can be broken up into the following parts:

P1.1 All Bachelors
P1.2 are unmarried

Whereas sentence (S2) can be broken up into the following parts:

P2.1 All unmarried adult males
P2.2 are unmarried

Clearly, there is a one-one correspondence that preserves word order. We just associate P1.1 with P2.1 and P1.2 with P2.2. Moreover, P1.2 and P2.2 definitely have the same meaning. So, if P1.1 and P2.1 have the same meaning, then according to our principle (S1) and (S2) express the same proposition. A plausible case can be made for the claim that P1.1 and P2.1 have the same meaning. But, I won't get into that right now. I just wanted to give an example which helps to show how the Naive Compositionality Principle works.

Now, here is how the argument goes. First, let's introduce "Fred" as a name for the unit meaning of 'The center of mass of Earth". Now, consider the following sentences:

S3. The center of mass of Earth is a point.

S4. Fred is a point.

Clearly (S3) expresses a truth. However, it seems that (S4) does not. (S4) is about the thing named by "Fred", a meaning, and meanings are not points. So, (S4) expresses a falsehood. But, according to Naive Compositionality and Millianism and under the assumption that "The center of mass of Earth" has a unit meaning, (S3) and (S4) express the same proposition. This is puzzling. We can formulate an argument as follows:

1. If "the center of mass of Earth" has a unit meaning, then (S3) and (S4) express the same proposition.
2. (S3) expresses a truth whereas (S4) does not.
3. If (2), then (S3) and (S4) do not express the same proposition.
4. So, "The center of mass of Earth" does not have a unit meaning.

(1) is justified by appealing to Millianism and the Naive Compositionality Principle. (2) seems pretty plausible. The fact that (S3) expresses a truth is an empirical discovery and I argued for the claim that (S4) expresses a falsehood above. Finally, (3) is justified by Leibniz's Law. So, our argument is valid and has strong support. Moreover, the argument can be generalized in a particular way to show that no definite description has a unit meanings. (Moreover, as Rock* pointed out to me, the same thing can be done with other quantificational sentences such as "All cats are furry" and "some dogs are happy".)

I disagree with the conclusion of the argument and I think the best premise to deny is (1). I think that Naive Compositionality is false. It seems to me that the fact that the subject of (S3) is grammatically a definite description whereas the subject of (S4) is not makes it so that (S3) and (S4) express different propositions. However, these propositions are made up of the same meanings in the same order. We have to replace Naive Compositionality with a principle that allows for grammatically different sentences with the same meanings in the same order to express different propositions.

I know this post is not exceedingly clear, But I hope it is clear enough to convey the puzzle and my solution. I'd like to know what others think of this puzzle.

Eternal Life

Suppose that a nearly omnipotent being comes to you and offers you eternal life. "This is how it works", he says. "You'll live out your life and grow old just as you normally would. But, at a ripe old age, your body will regenerate to the healthy state it is currently in and you'll be able to continue living and growing old from that point onward. This will happen an infinite number of times. Moreover, I guarantee that you will never suffer or be bored. You'll seem to live an infinite number of exciting and interesting lives, each one psychologically connected to the previous one."

This seems like a good deal to me. Moreover, I have asked a few other people about this case and they also seem to agree that this is a good deal. However, here is a slight twist to the case.

Suppose that the nearly omnipotent being suddenly says "oh darn, I just remembered that I can't offer you that deal. However, I can offer you something else. Here's the new deal. Instead of an infinite number of sequential regenerations, I'll make you an infinitely multiply located individual. There will be a series of life-like events hosted by you at your various locations. Each life-like event will persist for another 50 or so years. Moreover, each life like event will have a successor in the following sense. The mental states that are involved at the end of any one life-like event will be psychologically connected to the mental states of its successor. Just as before, you'll never suffer or be bored. You'll seem to live an infinite number of exciting and interesting lives, each one psychologically connected to the previous one.""

My intuitions, and the intuitions of those I surveyed, seem to indicate that this is not such a good deal. Some even think that it is not a deal worth taking. That is, you are no better off if you take the deal than if you don't. But, let's add another twist to the case.

Suppose another nearly omnipotent being comes to you and says "I can't believe that other yahoo just offered you that second deal. That deal is not very good and I can offer you a better one. He is right that the first deal is off the table. The reason is that the universe is going to end just a few minutes after you reach that ripe old age of 90. So, we can't give you a sequence of regenerations and guarantee your safety. However, I can offer you something just as good. Just like in the first deal, you'll regenerate to your current healthy state when you reach a certain age. However, you'll also be warped back in time to the moment when you first take the deal. You'll then live another 50 years or so, regenerate again and time warp again. This will happen an infinite number of times. So, you'll have eternal life (in some sense), much like in the first case. I also guarantee that you will never suffer or be bored. You'll seem to live an infinite number of exciting and interesting lives, each one psychologically connected to the previous one.""

Again, the intuitions of those I surveyed seem to indicate that this deal is better than the second. In fact, it seems to be just about as good as the first. But, it is not exactly clear why. The third deal will have results that are significantly similar to the second deal. Why is it that the third deal is better than the second and the second is worst than the first even though the third has results that are remarkably similar to the second?

Here is a suggested answer: (1) Somehow the causal connections between the various life-like events and preserved in the first and third deal but not the second. This is why the first and third are good deals and the second is not. Notice that this response might require a kind of robust realism about causation. I am not sure if this is a good answer and I am not sure why these preserved causal connections are so great. Why is it that the second case seems significantly lamer than the first or third?

If anyone has an idea about why the first and third deal are better than the second, I'd like to hear them. And if anyone thinks that the suggested answer above is on the right track, I'd like to know why the causal connections are so important that they make the second deal significantly worse the the first and third.