Monday, April 16, 2007

Pro-Attitude Theology

In this post I'd like to discuss an issue I've discussed in more detail on my personal blog, The GLFer. Those who would like more details are encouraged to look at what I have written there.

First, the background. Western philosophical theology has been dominated by a certain approach to theology often called "perfect being theology". The central concept of perfect being theology is that of a great-making property, where a property is said to be great-making iff all other things being equal, something is greater if it has that property than if it lacks that property. (Great-making properties can be conceived of via analogy to intrinsically good-making features.) Given this concept, proponents of perfect being theology claims that something is divine iff it has every great-making property to the highest degree. And, of course, they claim that there is something that is divine. The central question, then, of perfect being theology is whether there is something that has every great-making property to the highest degree.

I would like to propose an alternative to perfect being theology. The alternative is what I call "pro-attitude theology". There are two versions of pro-attitude theology that I would like to discuss, a simpler one (addressed in my post on The GLFer entitled "Pro-Attitude Theology Redux") and a more complex one (addressed in "Perfect Being Theology and Pro-Attitude Theology). The central concept of both versions of pro-attitude theology, however, is the same. It is the concept of a pro-attitude worthy property, where a property is a pro-attitude worthy property iff there is some pro-attitude such that all other things being equal, something that has that property deserves to have that pro-attitude borne to it.

According to the first version of pro-attitude theology, something is divine iff there are some pro-attitude worthy properties such that it has those properties and because it has those properties it deserves having every pro-attitude borne to it to the highest degree. According to the second, on the other hand, something is divine iff it has every pro-attitude worthy property and for every pro-attitude worthy property P that it has and every pro-attitude A, if all other things being equal, something that has P deserves having A borne towards it, then it has P to such a degree that it deserves having A borne towards it to the highest degree. I take it that it is obvious how to construct the central questions of both versions of pro-attitude theology.

There is one interesting difference between the first version of pro-attitude theology and the second. The difference is that, on the first version, there may be different "ways of being divine". For one thing might be divine in virtue of having certain pro-attitude worthy properties while something else is divine in virtue of having other pro-attitude worthy properties. On the other hand, on the second version of pro-attitude theology, there aren't different ways of being divine. This is because each divine being has every pro-attitude worthy property according to the second version and has that property to whatever degree is necessary to make it the case that it deserves to have the corresponding pro-attitude borne to it to the highest degree.

Let me close with some remarks about my motivation for introducing pro-attitude theology as an alternative to perfect being theology. I do not do so because I find it plausible that there is a being that is divine in the pro-attitude theology sense although there is no being that is divine in the perfect being theology sense. I find it likely that there is no being that is divine in either sense. However, I think that it is worthwhile investigating this alternative to perfect being theology because I think that just as it is an interesting question whether there is a divine being in the perfect being theology sense, it is an interesting question whether there is a divine being in the pro-attitude theology sense. And whereas philosophical theologians in the Western tradition have addressed the first question, they have not addressed the second. In addition, it is an interesting question whether an affirmative answer to either the central question of perfect being theology or the central question of pro-attitude theology has any religious significance. Finally, one interesting question of perfect being theology is what properties a being must have in order to be divine; or, in other words, what properties are great-making and what does having these properties to the highest degree entail? Similarly, I think, it is an interesting question what properties a being must have in order to be divine in the (second version of) pro-attitude theology sense; in other words, what properties are pro-attitude worthy properties and to what degree does something have to have each of those properties in order to deserve to have the corresponding pro-attitude borne to it to the highest degree?

Wednesday, April 04, 2007

What does it take to believe a proposition?

Just yesterday I read about a recent Newsweek poll according to which almost half of Americans deny the theory of evolution and over a third of college graduates believe that the Biblical creation story is true. These finding are, of course, rather disturbing for many reasons that I do not plan on going into here. But they got me thinking about a different issue: If someone were to ask me to state what the theory of evolution is, I don't think that I would be able to. I know the following: There is a theory, the theory of evolution, such that most scientists believe it be true because, they say, it is the best explanation of a number of facts of various sorts (biological, geological, etc.). Presumably I can, on the basis of the evidence I have, come to know (or at least reasonably believe) that the theory of evolution is true and that the theory of evolution is the best explanation of a number of facts of various sorts. However, given that I am unable to state what the theory of evolution says, it seems that I am unable to know or reasonably believe the theory of evolution itself since it seems that I am unable to believe that theory at all.

Let me make a few clarificatory remarks. I accept latitudinarianism about de re belief. In other words, I think it is very easy to have beliefs about particular things. If there is a shortest spy and I introduce the name 'Shorty' by saying "Let 'Shorty' refer to the shortest spy", then I can believe things about the shortest spy; that is, I can believe things about the guy out there who is the shortest spy. For instance, I can believe that he is the shortest spy, that he is less than 6' tall, and so forth. In other words, on my view de re belief is really easy. (I should note that I also think that so-called de rebus belief is really easy as well. If there are some spies that are shorter than 6' tall and I introduce the plurally referring name 'Shorties' by saying "Let 'Shorties' refer to the spies that are shorter than 6' tall", then I can believe things about the spies who are shorter than 6' tall. For instance, I can believe that they are the spies that are shorter than 6' tall, that each of them is shorter than 6' tall, and so forth.)

I take it that many non-latitudinarians would deny that I can have any beliefs about the theory of evolution at all because I am not well enough "acquainted" with that theory to have such beliefs. I deny this since I think that I do have beliefs about the theory of evolution; for instance, I believe that it is true. So, the issue I'm raising here is not an issue concerning whether I can have beliefs about the theory of evolution. I think that I can have such beliefs. Rather, the issue is whether I can believe the theory of evolution, given my ignorance concerning how to state it.

It will, perhaps, be helpful when considering this question to take scientific theories to be conjunctive propositions. (Or, perhaps, sets (or pluralities) of propositions. If they are sets (or pluralities) of propositions rather than propositions, then I take it that someone believes a scientific theory just in case he believes each of its members (or just in case he believes each proposition that is one of the scientific theory) and a scientific theory is true just in case each of its members are true (or just in case each proposition that is one of the scientific theory is true).) I take it that it is only if we take scientific theories, such as the theory of evolution, to be propositions that it makes sense to talk, as we usually do, about believing a scientific theory (modulo my remarks about sets or pluralities of propositions). So let us assume, for the sake of argument, that scientific theories are conjunctive propositions.

(I should note that the view that scientific theories are conjunctive propositions (or sets or pluralities of propositions) is a controversial one. As far as I am able to discern from the philosophy of science I've learned, many philosophers of science reject this view. Some hold rather that scientific theories are a set methods for explaining phenomena. I do not have space to do this view justice. However, it seems to me that this view has a difficult time making sense of the way we speak about scientific theories; in particular, it has difficulty making sense of the fact that we often talk about believing scientific theories and we often talk about scientific theories as being true or false.)

Back to the main line of argument. I claim that although I can have beliefs about the theory of evolution, which I take to be some particular conjunctive proposition, I cannot believe the theory of evolution given my inability to state that theory. Is this so?

Here is a sort of argument for my view. Suppose that there is a language of thought. Call it "Mentalese". Someone believes a proposition just in case he or she has a Mentalese sentence that expresses that proposition in his or her belief box. A Mentalese sentence expresses a proposition only if its syntactic structure corresponds to the structure of that proposition, its syntactic constituents express the constituents of that proposition, and its syntactic constituents are arranged in the right way. (I add the last clause because, presumably, the Mentalese sentence that expresses the proposition that John loves Mary and the Mentalese sentence that expresses the proposition that Mary loves John have the same syntactic structure and their syntactic constituents each express the constituents of both propositions.) Now it seems to me that the fact that I am unable to state the theory of evolution provides good evidence to think that I have no Mentalese sentence in my belief box expressing the theory of evolution that satisfies these conditions and thus provides good reason to think that I have no Mentalese sentence in my belief box that expresses the theory of evolution.

Notice that this is not to say that I have nothing in my belief box that expresses the theory of evolution. I think I do. In particular, I think that I have a Mentalese singular term that expresses the theory of evolution and that, in virtue of this, I am able to believe things of the theory of evolution. However, this is not sufficient to allow me to believe the theory of evolution, I say, because surely there will be syntactic rules specifying which Mentalese expressions are sentences (well-formed formulas, if you like) according to which a Mentalese singular term is not a Mentalese sentence. And, as I have claimed, one can only believe a proposition if one has a Mentalese sentence in one's belief box that expresses that proposition.

Anyway, what do the rest of you think? What does it take to believe a proposition? Do I believe the theory of evolution or simply believe that it is true?