Epistemic Analyticity
I'm sorry this post is a bit late. This chapter was rather long and I only just finished reading it. It also turns out that, due to the length of the chapter, a significant amount of time has passed since I read the beginning sections. I mention this because I think that Williamson addressed the idea that I am going to bring up in this post. But, since he addressed it toward the beginning of the chapter and since he said a lot in this chapter, I don't remember exactly what he said in response to the idea I'm going to present.
In the last chapter, Williamson considered metaphysical accounts of analyticity. However, such accounts suffered from a gap problem; there always seemed to be a gap between the analytic status of a sentence and our putatively easy knowledge of the proposition expressed by that sentence. That is, it seemed that there was no way to support the idea that if a sentence is metaphysically analytic, then it expresses a proposition that is epistemically accessible independant of various experiences. In this chapter, Williamson considers epistemic accounts of analyticity. The hope is that epistemic accounts will not suffer from such a gap problem.
Williamson approaches the subject in a rather circuitous way. He first introduces understanding/assent links and then suggests that such links can be used to support the claim that analytic sentences express propositions that are (in some sense) easily known. I am not exactly sure why he didn't just get straight to the heart of the issue. Although he considered unserstanding/knowledge links and understanding/justification links, he did not make them the central issue of his discussion. In this post, I'd like to consider approaching the idea of epistemic analyticity more directly.
Let's start with the intuitive idea that any possible native English speaker who understands a sentence like "Every vixen is a vixen" should have some positive epistemic status toward the proposition expressed by that sentence unless s/he has strong evidence against that proposition. Alternatively, some one might say that any possible native English speaker who understands the sentence in question will be justified in believing the proposition expressed by that sentence as long as s/he has no defeaters. Or, perhaps someone might say that any possible native English speaker who understands the sentence will be prima facie justified in believing the proposition expressed by that sentence. I am not exactly sure how to spell out this intuitive idea and I am not sure if the three things I wrote above are even (in any sense) equivalent. but, I think the idea, vague though it is, is clear enough to think about. So, let's just take the following principle and run with it under the assumption that prima facie justification can be overwhelmed by countervailing evidence:
(EA) For any English sentence S, S is epistemically analytic (if and) only if any possible native english speaker who understands S is prima facie justified in believing S.
The idea here seems to be that analytic sentences are such that understanding them is constitutive of some kind of evidence for the proposition expressed by that sentence. Of course, one can have evidence against the proposition expressed by an analytic sentence. So, for example, the theorists from Williamson' example have evidence against the proposition expressed by "every vixen is a vixen" because they believe or have evidence for some alternative theory that suggests that the claim that every vixen is a vixen is not true. Thus, Peter is not justified in believing that every vixen is a vixen becuase he has reason to believe that such a claim entails that vixens exist. This does not show, though, that he is not prima facie justified in believing that every vixen is a vixen. He might very well be prima facie justified yet have evidence that makes him ultimately not justified in believing that proposition. Similar things can be said for Stephan who denies "every vixen is a vixen" because he thinks that certain sentences with vague expressions are indeterminate in truth value.
Williamson does consider a couple of objections to something like (AE). If I remember correctly, he considers a case involving a man who decides to believe phlogiston theory simply because he likes the word or has good memories involving the word or something like that. Williamson claims that such a theorist is not even prima facie justified in phlogiston theory. I am a bit confused by this example though. Are we supposed to be taking certain tenets of phlogiston theory as analytic? why can't we, for example, simply say that our theorist is not at all justified in believing the central tenets of phlogiston theory and, moreover, those tenets are not analytic? I honestly don't remember what Williamson says in response to these questions. So, if someone can help me out, I would appreciate it.
However, I think there is a decent response to this criticism even if we accept that certain central tenets of phlogiston theory are analytic. We should make a distinction between being justified in believing and justifiably believing a proposition. Someone can be justified in believing a proposition, yet fail to justifiably believe that proposition. The theorist who believes phlogiston theory might be in such a position. Perhaps his mere understanding of certain sentences of phlogiston theory provides him with prima facie justification for the propositions expressed by those sentences. Moreover, absent any evidence against those propositions, he might even be justified in believing them. However, if he believes those propositions because of his fond memories, then he is not basing his belief appropriately. That is, he is not justifiably believing the propositions even though he is justified in believing them.
I kind of like (AE). I'm sure there will be problems with it. But, as far as I can see, Williamson has not introduced any such problems. One might worry that if there is such a link between understanding and prima facie justification, there needs to be an explanation of that link. In other words, we need a theory of why those sentences like "every vixen is a vixen" are such that mere understanding of them implies prima facie justification in the propositions they express. I am not sure how to respond to a demand for an explanation of such a link. However, I am inclined to say that nothing more needs to be said. Understanding such sentences is enough to provide prima facie justification for the propositions they express. Perhaps understanding them even constitutes prima facie justification. But, I am not sure about the plausibility of defense.
In the last chapter, Williamson considered metaphysical accounts of analyticity. However, such accounts suffered from a gap problem; there always seemed to be a gap between the analytic status of a sentence and our putatively easy knowledge of the proposition expressed by that sentence. That is, it seemed that there was no way to support the idea that if a sentence is metaphysically analytic, then it expresses a proposition that is epistemically accessible independant of various experiences. In this chapter, Williamson considers epistemic accounts of analyticity. The hope is that epistemic accounts will not suffer from such a gap problem.
Williamson approaches the subject in a rather circuitous way. He first introduces understanding/assent links and then suggests that such links can be used to support the claim that analytic sentences express propositions that are (in some sense) easily known. I am not exactly sure why he didn't just get straight to the heart of the issue. Although he considered unserstanding/knowledge links and understanding/justification links, he did not make them the central issue of his discussion. In this post, I'd like to consider approaching the idea of epistemic analyticity more directly.
Let's start with the intuitive idea that any possible native English speaker who understands a sentence like "Every vixen is a vixen" should have some positive epistemic status toward the proposition expressed by that sentence unless s/he has strong evidence against that proposition. Alternatively, some one might say that any possible native English speaker who understands the sentence in question will be justified in believing the proposition expressed by that sentence as long as s/he has no defeaters. Or, perhaps someone might say that any possible native English speaker who understands the sentence will be prima facie justified in believing the proposition expressed by that sentence. I am not exactly sure how to spell out this intuitive idea and I am not sure if the three things I wrote above are even (in any sense) equivalent. but, I think the idea, vague though it is, is clear enough to think about. So, let's just take the following principle and run with it under the assumption that prima facie justification can be overwhelmed by countervailing evidence:
(EA) For any English sentence S, S is epistemically analytic (if and) only if any possible native english speaker who understands S is prima facie justified in believing S.
The idea here seems to be that analytic sentences are such that understanding them is constitutive of some kind of evidence for the proposition expressed by that sentence. Of course, one can have evidence against the proposition expressed by an analytic sentence. So, for example, the theorists from Williamson' example have evidence against the proposition expressed by "every vixen is a vixen" because they believe or have evidence for some alternative theory that suggests that the claim that every vixen is a vixen is not true. Thus, Peter is not justified in believing that every vixen is a vixen becuase he has reason to believe that such a claim entails that vixens exist. This does not show, though, that he is not prima facie justified in believing that every vixen is a vixen. He might very well be prima facie justified yet have evidence that makes him ultimately not justified in believing that proposition. Similar things can be said for Stephan who denies "every vixen is a vixen" because he thinks that certain sentences with vague expressions are indeterminate in truth value.
Williamson does consider a couple of objections to something like (AE). If I remember correctly, he considers a case involving a man who decides to believe phlogiston theory simply because he likes the word or has good memories involving the word or something like that. Williamson claims that such a theorist is not even prima facie justified in phlogiston theory. I am a bit confused by this example though. Are we supposed to be taking certain tenets of phlogiston theory as analytic? why can't we, for example, simply say that our theorist is not at all justified in believing the central tenets of phlogiston theory and, moreover, those tenets are not analytic? I honestly don't remember what Williamson says in response to these questions. So, if someone can help me out, I would appreciate it.
However, I think there is a decent response to this criticism even if we accept that certain central tenets of phlogiston theory are analytic. We should make a distinction between being justified in believing and justifiably believing a proposition. Someone can be justified in believing a proposition, yet fail to justifiably believe that proposition. The theorist who believes phlogiston theory might be in such a position. Perhaps his mere understanding of certain sentences of phlogiston theory provides him with prima facie justification for the propositions expressed by those sentences. Moreover, absent any evidence against those propositions, he might even be justified in believing them. However, if he believes those propositions because of his fond memories, then he is not basing his belief appropriately. That is, he is not justifiably believing the propositions even though he is justified in believing them.
I kind of like (AE). I'm sure there will be problems with it. But, as far as I can see, Williamson has not introduced any such problems. One might worry that if there is such a link between understanding and prima facie justification, there needs to be an explanation of that link. In other words, we need a theory of why those sentences like "every vixen is a vixen" are such that mere understanding of them implies prima facie justification in the propositions they express. I am not sure how to respond to a demand for an explanation of such a link. However, I am inclined to say that nothing more needs to be said. Understanding such sentences is enough to provide prima facie justification for the propositions they express. Perhaps understanding them even constitutes prima facie justification. But, I am not sure about the plausibility of defense.
posted by Joshua at 12:50 PM
3 Comments:
Hey Joshua,
About phlogiston theory -- I think Williamson was taking some tenets of the theory to be analytic. Perhaps he had in mind sentences like this: "Phlogiston is released during combustion." This claim is false and moreover no one is justified in believing it. Nevertheless, we can understand it. So there are some analytic claims that don't obey the understanding-truth link or the understanding-justification link.
About the distinction between being justified in believing and justifiably believing -- sounds like this distinction is going to be controversial since it seems to presuppose the possibility of "external" justification. But even if we allow for that, I doubt it gets Williamson's opponent what he wants for precisely the reason you point out: it's unclear what link my understanding has with my being justified in believing the thing I understand. And doesn't the proponent of the linguistic turn need there to be such a link? Otherwise what good would this conception of analyticity do for helping to support thesis that philosophy is primarily conceptual?
(I predict you'll respond by saying you don't know because you don't understand what the linguistic turn is supposed to be...I agree with you.)
Hi Neal,
It is surprising to me that Williamson is taking any false statement to be analytic. I thought that an analytic statement had to be true.
I guess I was thinking that in spite of the fact that Phlogiston theory is false, there are still some sentences of phlogiston theory that are true and analytically true.
I am hesitant to say that I think Williamson might be confusing a couple of things. Consider these two sentences:
S1: Some phlogiston is released during combustion.
S2: Anything that is phlogiston is released during combustion.
Plausibly, S1 expressed an empirical statement that commits us to the existence of phlogiston and happens to be false. However, S2 expresses an analytic statement that is true and that does not commit us to the existence of phlogiston. I worry that a bare noun phrase like this one only makes things more confusing:
S3: Phlogiston is released during combustion.
S3 makes things more confusing because it seems plausible to use S3 in a situation where you are intending to convey what S1 expresses and in other situations where you are trying to convey what S2 expresses. In any case, it seems that whatever you are saying is either going to be like S1 (empirical and false) and like S2 (analytic and true).
I also wanted to respond to your comment about the distinction between being justified in believing and justifiably believing. You suggest that it is going to be controversial because it presupposes the possibility of external justification. I guess I am not sure what you mean by "external justification". I tend to be an internalist about justification, yet I still think sense can be made of the distinction.
Suppose that you have a person who is having a visual experience as if there is something blue in front of him. It seems that he is justified in believing that something is blue. This is all internalist. What he is justified in believing is determined by his mental states. However, he might still believe that something is blue not because of his visual experience but because of his love for the color. In this case, although he is justified in his belief, he is not justifiably believing. This all seems consistent with an internalist account of justification.
You might have had something else in mind when you said that the distinction presupposes external justification.
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