Rights and Permissions
I have some ethical issues that I want to discuss. I know that it is not normal for me to discuss such issues, but I hope everyone will forgive me for this unusual diversion. I have been teaching ethics classes for a little while now and I've noticed that my students tend to use the word 'right' when philosophers would typically use the word 'permitted'. For example, my students might object to a view by saying 'no one has a right to do that' whereas a philosopher would put the objection by saying that 'no one is permitted to do that'. Similarly, my students often say 'we have a right to do A' in a situation where a philosopher might typically say 'we are permitted to do A'.
Many years ago, I took a class on moral rights theory and my students comments have made me start to think about the nature of moral rights again. In my rights class, we talked about two reductive theories of rights. The first reductive rights theory can be stated as follows:
(RR1) Necessarily: for any S and any action A, S has a moral right to do A iff S is morally permitted to do A and no one is morally permitted to stop S from doing A.
(Let's ignore complications that might arise with the generality of these claims and take all permissions, obligations and (hence) rights to be presumptive or prima facie.)
If (RR1) is correct, then it is logically consistent to say that someone is permitted to do A and yet doesn't have a right to do it. That is, to be a bit more precise, the conjunction of (RR1) with the thesis that someone is permitted to do some action yet does not have a right to do that action is logically consistent. So, from a logical point of view, it seems that we are saying something more when we say that a person has a right to do something than when we say that he is permitted to do so. but, my students don't seem to talk this way. They seem to take having a right to do something as equivalent to being permitted to do it.
I think that my students might be on to something. Although the position that someone is permitted to do something even though they don't have a right to do so is logically consistent, I am not sure that it is metaphysically possible. I can't seem to think of a situation where some one is morally permitted to do something yet some second person is morally permitted to stop that first person from doing that thing. That is, the following permission principle seems true to me:
(PP) Necessarily, for any S and any A, if S is morally permitted to do A, then no one is morally permitted to stop S from doing A.
Here is my quick defense of that thesis: Suppose that possibly, there is a person, S1, who is permitted to do A and yet there is a second person S2 who is morally permitted to stop S1 from doing A. If S2 is morally permitted to stop S1 from doing A, then there must be some negative moral feature of S1's action that warrents its being stopped. But, if there is some negative moral feature about S1's action that warrants its being stopped, then S1 is not really morally permitted to perform that action (contrary to our supposition). So, it seems to follow that necessarily, for any S and any A, if S is morally permitted to do A, then no one is morally permitted to stop S from doing A. That is, (PP) is true.
If (PP) is true, then although my students might be saying something with greater logical content when they say that someone has a right to do something as apposed to saying that he merely has a permission to do so, their claims might still be acceptable. After all, it is not really possible to have a permission without also having a right.
Of course, all this depends on my rather rough argument for (PP) and the controversial thesis (RR1). Some people, for example hold an alternative view about rights. They often say that a right implies more than just an obligation of non-interference. Some say that rights imply a kind of obligation of protection. It is hard to express this idea in a reductive principle, but the rough idea is something like the following:
(RR2) Necessarily: for any S and any A, S has a moral right to do A iff S is morally permitted to do A and everyone is morally obligated to ensure that no one interferes with S's doing A.
(RR1) is often called a negative rights theory whereas (RR2) is called a positive rights theory. Now, I have not thought about whether similar considerations would indicate a kind of metaphysical equivalence between having a right and having a permission given (RR2). So, someone might tentatively object to my claim that my students are on to something by endorsing (RR2). But, I think I might be inclined to turn such an objection on its head. That is, if (RR2) really does indicate that having a right is different from having a permission, then since my students are so inclined to take these two things as equivalent, we have some reason to favor (RR1) over (RR2). Of course, it is only a small reason and it might be defeated by other considerations in favor or (RR2). But, right now, I am inclined to reject this tentative objection.
So, that is my digression into moral philosophy for the day. I would be interested to hear what others think of my argument for (PP). I am also interested in thinking about whether a similar argument can show that the following permission/obligation principle is true:
(POP) Necessarily, for any S and any A, if S is morally permitted to do A, then everyone else is morally obligated to ensure that no one interferes with S's doing A.
If (POP) does happen to be true, then having a right and having a permission would be the same even if (RR2) is true. Unfortunately, this principle sounds less plausible to me, but I honestly haven't thought much about it.
Many years ago, I took a class on moral rights theory and my students comments have made me start to think about the nature of moral rights again. In my rights class, we talked about two reductive theories of rights. The first reductive rights theory can be stated as follows:
(RR1) Necessarily: for any S and any action A, S has a moral right to do A iff S is morally permitted to do A and no one is morally permitted to stop S from doing A.
(Let's ignore complications that might arise with the generality of these claims and take all permissions, obligations and (hence) rights to be presumptive or prima facie.)
If (RR1) is correct, then it is logically consistent to say that someone is permitted to do A and yet doesn't have a right to do it. That is, to be a bit more precise, the conjunction of (RR1) with the thesis that someone is permitted to do some action yet does not have a right to do that action is logically consistent. So, from a logical point of view, it seems that we are saying something more when we say that a person has a right to do something than when we say that he is permitted to do so. but, my students don't seem to talk this way. They seem to take having a right to do something as equivalent to being permitted to do it.
I think that my students might be on to something. Although the position that someone is permitted to do something even though they don't have a right to do so is logically consistent, I am not sure that it is metaphysically possible. I can't seem to think of a situation where some one is morally permitted to do something yet some second person is morally permitted to stop that first person from doing that thing. That is, the following permission principle seems true to me:
(PP) Necessarily, for any S and any A, if S is morally permitted to do A, then no one is morally permitted to stop S from doing A.
Here is my quick defense of that thesis: Suppose that possibly, there is a person, S1, who is permitted to do A and yet there is a second person S2 who is morally permitted to stop S1 from doing A. If S2 is morally permitted to stop S1 from doing A, then there must be some negative moral feature of S1's action that warrents its being stopped. But, if there is some negative moral feature about S1's action that warrants its being stopped, then S1 is not really morally permitted to perform that action (contrary to our supposition). So, it seems to follow that necessarily, for any S and any A, if S is morally permitted to do A, then no one is morally permitted to stop S from doing A. That is, (PP) is true.
If (PP) is true, then although my students might be saying something with greater logical content when they say that someone has a right to do something as apposed to saying that he merely has a permission to do so, their claims might still be acceptable. After all, it is not really possible to have a permission without also having a right.
Of course, all this depends on my rather rough argument for (PP) and the controversial thesis (RR1). Some people, for example hold an alternative view about rights. They often say that a right implies more than just an obligation of non-interference. Some say that rights imply a kind of obligation of protection. It is hard to express this idea in a reductive principle, but the rough idea is something like the following:
(RR2) Necessarily: for any S and any A, S has a moral right to do A iff S is morally permitted to do A and everyone is morally obligated to ensure that no one interferes with S's doing A.
(RR1) is often called a negative rights theory whereas (RR2) is called a positive rights theory. Now, I have not thought about whether similar considerations would indicate a kind of metaphysical equivalence between having a right and having a permission given (RR2). So, someone might tentatively object to my claim that my students are on to something by endorsing (RR2). But, I think I might be inclined to turn such an objection on its head. That is, if (RR2) really does indicate that having a right is different from having a permission, then since my students are so inclined to take these two things as equivalent, we have some reason to favor (RR1) over (RR2). Of course, it is only a small reason and it might be defeated by other considerations in favor or (RR2). But, right now, I am inclined to reject this tentative objection.
So, that is my digression into moral philosophy for the day. I would be interested to hear what others think of my argument for (PP). I am also interested in thinking about whether a similar argument can show that the following permission/obligation principle is true:
(POP) Necessarily, for any S and any A, if S is morally permitted to do A, then everyone else is morally obligated to ensure that no one interferes with S's doing A.
If (POP) does happen to be true, then having a right and having a permission would be the same even if (RR2) is true. Unfortunately, this principle sounds less plausible to me, but I honestly haven't thought much about it.
posted by Joshua at 1:59 PM
5 Comments:
Joshua,
My students say the same kind of thing.
A quick counterexample to (PP).
You're permitted to do A because A is the best of your alternatives. I'm permitted to stop you from doing A because stopping you from doing A is the best of my alternatives. Consequentialism is true, and, if so, one is always permitted to do what is the best of their alternatives.
A quick counterexample to (RR2).
You're permitted to do A. If I interfere and keep you from doing A, then I bring about a very good state of affairs (that you are completely unaware of). So, I'm permitted to interfere. So, I'm not obligated to keep anyone from interfering with what you're permitted to do.
Suppose we distinguish S has a right to do A from A is the right thing to do for S. If we do this we can vindicate your student's intuitions and keep the distinction between permissions and mere permissions. The right thing to do is what is best, and so not merely permitted, and one has a right to do what is merely permitted. It turns out, though strangely, that one could have a right to do something it is not right to do.
Sounds weird, but I think this is what accepting your student's intuitions and Consequentialism implies.
Christian,
Your quick counterexample to (PP) is exactly the kind of case that I have been worrying about. There are two ways that the counterexample can be filled out.
The first way gives an internalist reading to "best of S's alternatives" where the best of S's alternatives is whatever alternative S's total evidence indicates will have the best consequences. On this reading it is very easy to come up with examples where although you have good reason to believe that doing A will have the best consequences, I have good reason to believe that stopping you will have the best consequences. For example, suppose that S1 justifiably believe that some world leader will cause great harm if he is not assassinated by S1. It seems, then, that the best of S1's alternatives, in this internalist sense, is to assassinate that world leader. But, S2 might justifiably believe that great harms will result if he does not stop the assassination. So, stopping S1 from assassinating the world leader is the best of S2's alternatives (in this internalist sense).
I think we probably both agree that this internalist reading is not the appropriate reading to give to "best of S's alternatives". After all, we want to talk about objective moral permissibility.
But, there might be a way to spell out the counterexample without the internalist reading of "best of S's alternatives. Consider the following case:
Case 1
S1 either buys milk or fails to buying milk. If he fails to buy milk, then a group of sinister aliens will destroy all life in Mexico. So, it seems like he should buy milk. S2, on the other hand, either stops S1 from buying milk or does not stop S1 from buying milk. But a second group of sinister aliens will destroy all life in Canada if S2 does not stop S1 from buying milk. So, it seems like the best thing for S2 to do is to stop S1 from buying milk.
I don't think example 1 works. If we are talking about the value of consequences, then there will be two options:
Option 1
S1 buys milk and S2 does not stop him. Consequences: Canada is lost.
Option 2
S2 stops S1 from buying milk and S1 thereby fails to buy milk. Consequences: Mexico is lost.
One of those consequences, the loss of Canada or the loss of Mexico will be worse than the other. If the loss of Canada is worse, then the best option for available to S1 is to buy milk and the best option available to S2 is to let S1 buy milk. On the other hand, if the loss of Mexico is worse, then the best option for S2 is to stop S1 from buying milk and the best option for S1 is to thereby fail to buy milk.
we could change the case a bit. Let's consider this modification:
Case 2
S1 either buys milk or fails to buying milk. If he fails to buy milk, then a group of sinister aliens will destroy all life on Earth. S2, on the other hand, either stops S1 from buying milk or does not stop S1 from buying milk. But, a second group of sinister aliens will destroy all life on Earth if S2 does not stop S1 from buying milk.
In this case, it seems like the consequences are the same for either of the two options available to S1 and S2: The Earth is destroyed. So, the values of the consequences are the same. In this case, you might think that since the consequences are equally bad for either option available to S1 and equally bad for either option available to S2, they are both permitted to do either one.
I think this second case is better, but I am not confident that it works. This is because I am not sure that the values of the consequences are the same. As I see it there are again two options:
Option 1
S1 buys milk and S2 does not stop him. Consequences: Earth is destroyed while S2 leaves S1 alone.
Option 2
S2 stops S1 from buying milk and S1 thereby fails to buy milk. Consequences: Earth is destroyed while S2 interferes with S1's life.
If the interference has negative moral value, then Option 2 is worse than Option 1. but, then again, it looks like S1 is permitted to buy milk and S2 is not permitted to stop him.
I am not confident about this kind of response to the putative counterexamples to (PP). but, they seem somewhat plausible to me.
Two last comments:
First, I don't understand the counterexample to (RR2) because it doesn't specify whether anyone has a right to do A. Maybe you were thinking that I have a right to do A, but you are permitted to interfere with my doing A. If that is right, then I think the counterexample needs to be spelled out a bit more. The positive rights theorist might very well say that, contrary to what you might initially think, I did not have a right to do A in the first place.
Second, I think that the students are not saying that the right thing to do is A when they say you have a right to do A. I am pretty sure they often think that if you have a right to do A, then you are permitted to do A and you are permitted to refrain from doing A. But, if the right thing to do is A, then I am not permitted to refrain from doing A.
I have an alternative explanation. If I were convinced that my arguments in the initial post were mistaken and that sometimes you can be permitted to do something even though you don't have a right to do so, then I would try to explain the students comments with conversational maxims. When they say "S has a right to do A" they literally say that S has a right to do A. but, they are violating some kind of conversational maxim that says don't say too much. So, they are intending to convey the weaker claim that S is permitted to do A.
Joshua,
It seems to me that there are many circumstances in which someone lacks a right to do something morally permissible. Surely there's nothing morally wrong about my carrying a regular size shampoo bottle into the airport, but the TSA can stop me. Or, to take a nonlegal example, there's nothing morally wrong about a teenager staying out until midnight on a school night, but his parents can stop him.
I'm inclined to think that the issue of rights is orthogonal to the issue of moral permissibility, in part because I'm inclined to think it's possible for me to have a right to act impermissibly. Suppose I'm riding on a bus and an old woman gets on and has no place to sit. I think it's plausible to suppose both that I ought to give her my seat and also that I have a right to keep my seat if I want to...you can't (with authority) tell me to get up, for example.
Hi Joshua,
I'm not sure that an externalist reading is the important one. But you're right my case doesn't work on an externalist reading. Fair enough.
Case 2 seems plausible to me. And interference doesn't seem to have negative moral value as such. We could stipulate that S1 is not aware he is being interfered with, that ought to take the contrary intuition away.
My counterexample to RR2 assumes an internalist reading too. It won't work if you're assuming the externalist reading is the relevant one.
But, if the right thing to do is A, then I am not permitted to refrain from doing.
I suspect people would deny this. The right thing to do is to give to charity. But people would also claim that you're permitted not to, that you have a right not to. I would deny this. But I think students are committed to the distinction if what they say is to be consistent.
I'm not sure about the pragmatic explanation. It might be right, but I'm inclined to think that the idea of having a right to do something incorporates pretheoretical beliefs about personal constraints. Intuitively, one has a right to refrain from doing something that comes at a great personal cost, even if, ignoring those costs, we would say doing that thing is the right thing to do. For example, the right thing to do is to flop myself in front of the trolley headed towards the innocent five, but I have a right not to flop myself.
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