Variation

we are all familiar with problems of variation. There is the problem of temporal variation: How can something be bent and then be straight? The problem of spatial variation: How can something be striped purple and red? The problem of modal variation: How can something be contingently solid? Some people turn these problems of variation into arguments for their own preferred metaphysical views. But, we all know that there are lots of answers to these questions, some of them more amenable to certain metaphysical views than others and some of them more plausible than others. Here is a brief list of some of the solutions to the problem of variation:

Objects have temporal/spatial/modal parts and and it is in virtue of the fact that various parts exemplify various properties that those objects have temporal/spatial/modal variation.

Objects have temporal/spatial/modal counterparts and it is in virtue various counterparts exemplifying various properties that those objects have temporal/spatial/modal variation.

Properties are exemplified relative to times/spaces/worlds and it is in virtue of an object exemplifying various properties relative to various times/spaces/worlds that objects have temporal/spatial/modal variation.

Properties have temporal/spatial/modal parts and it is in virtue of exemplifying the various temporal/spatial/modal parts of properties that objects have temporal/spatial/modal variation (this is my simplified version of the trope solution defended by Ehring).

Properties are distributive across times/spaces/worlds and it is in virtue of exemplifying such distributive properties that objects have temporal/spatial/modal variation (Parsons' distributive properties solution).

This list is not exhaustive. But, I take these to be some of the top candidate solutions. Some of these solutions might be more plausible explanations of one kind of variation than of another kind of variation. For example, it seems that spatial parts is a rather plausible solution to the problem of spatial variation whereas modal parts is not a very plausible solution to the problem of modal variation. One thing that I like to do is compare the plausibility of the solutions in various arenas of variation. Another thing that I like to do is try to find new arenas of variation and see how plausible counterpart solutions might be in that arena. For example, I suggested in a post a while ago that there is a problem of divine variation for a God that satisfies Aquinas' doctrine of divine simplicity. I thought that something like distributive properties might be able to help out Aquinas.

Last night I thought of another arena of variation: Sortals. I am both a thinker and a karaoke singer. But, whereas I am a good thinker, I am a bad (very bad) karaoke singer. So, it seems that I am both good and bad. What can account for this variations.

Some people might think that this simply a variant of the problem of temporal variation. But, it is not. The problem can arise for sortals that I have, and will satisfy all my live. For example, I am and will always be a human animal and I am and will (probably) always be a sibling. But, wereas I think I am a good human animal (or at least a decent one) I have not always been a good sibling. In fact it is possible for someone to always be a bad sibling and a good human animal. So, the problem is not simply one of temporal variation. So, what can we say. Here is a list of some solutions to the problem of sortal variation and my initial judgments of those views:

View:
Objects have sortal parts and and it is in virtue of the fact that various parts exemplify various properties that those objects have sortal variation.

Reaction:
Not very plausible I think.

View:
Objects have sortal counterparts and it is in virtue various counterparts exemplifying various properties that those objects have sortal variation.

Reaction:
What??

View:
Properties are exemplified relative to sortals and it is in virtue of an object exemplifying various properties relative to various sortals that objects have sortal variation.

Reaction:
I think this is the standard view. It seems rather plausible to me. But, I wonder if some other view would have greater theoretical virtues. For example, we might be able to have a better account of the semantics of "qua" sentences of we adopt one of the alternative views.

View:
Properties have sortal parts and it is in virtue of exemplifying the various sortal parts of properties that objects have sortal variation.

Reaction:
interesting and not completely implausible. This might be worth thinking about more.

View:
Properties are distributive across sortals and it is in virtue of exemplifying such distributive properties that objects have sortal variation.

Reaction:
Again, this seems interesting. I think this might be worth thinking about more as well.

I have only just started thinking about this topic but right now I am thinking that these last two views might be worth thinking about more. My initial thoughts are about "qua" sentences and whether these latter two views might be able to handle the semantics of "qua" sentences better than other views. I am also interested in the following: If I am in a deep sea dive and see a strange thing and my guide tells me that it is a fishus strangicus, then once he tells me that it is a bright colored fishus strangicus, I will be able to identify other bright colored fishi strangici. However, if he tells me that it is a beautiful one, then I probably still won't be able to identify other beautiful fishi strangici. I wonder if one of these latter views can help out with this problem. Those are just some of my initial thoughts. I will think more about this in the future and see if I can come work out these theories and figure out some of their various theoretical virtues and vices (their theoretical variation).