Philosophical Questions

I think that Williamson's arguments for the conclusion that philosophical questions are not always about (either implicitly or explicitly) language are (for the most part) sound. It seems clear to me that the original question:

Was mars always either dry or not dry?

is not question about language or concepts. However, I do think that this is a question that is best answered by thinking about our language or concepts. In fact, here are three theses, each of which seems rather plausible to me, about the nature of philosophical questions:

T1: Philosophical questions are questions that can be answered only by analyzing our concepts or language (if they can be answered at all).

T2: Philosophical questions are questions that can be best answered by analyzing our concepts or language (if they can be answered at all).

T3: Philosophical questions are questions that are appropriately answered by analyzing our concepts or language (if they can be answered at all).

Williamson doesn't really address any of these theses. Although, some of the things he says may suggest that some of these theses are true or that some of them are false. However, each of these theses seems plausible to me and might be a way of holding onto the view that (in some sense) philosophy is primarily conceptual. Perhaps a defense of one of these theses is put philosophy right back into the concepual turn.

That being said, although I find these theses plausible, I do have worries about them. One worry is that some philosophical questions can seem to be answered by methods that are just as easily done from the armchair as philosophical analysis, but which are not methods of philosophical analysis. For example, Lewis attempts to answer the philosophical question "Are there any possible worlds?" by weighing the pros and cons of the various answers to that question against one another. It seems that if the philosophical question "Are there possible worlds?" can be answered by Lewis' method, then T1 is be false. Moreover, if there is no better way to answer that question than by Lewis' method, then T2 is false. Finally, if it is perfectly appropriate to answer that question by Lewis' method, then T3 is false.

As I see it, one can try to show how a Lewisian kind of argument can be turned into a argument involving conceptual analysis or one can give up on theses T1-T3. I do not know what the best response to this kind of worry is. In any case, it seems that these theses might be appropriate ways of characterizing the thesis that philosophy is concpetual. Moreover, even though the lewis example provides a decent case against theses T1-T3, it is not clear to me that these theses are false.

Being About or Being Stuck Within?

I was not a big fan of chapter 2. In part, this was because I felt like the detour through the details of various theories of vagueness was a distraction. For his overall purposes, Williamson certainly could have left the details of three-valued logic and fuzzy logic and all that to one side. But also, I'm not sure he really addressed the worries of those who think that the only things we study in philosophy are the structures of thought and/or language.

I think he did a good job of showing that some philosophical questions are not either explicitly or implicitly about language and thought, in any natural sense of the word 'about'. But I suspect that people who think all philosophy is in some sense conceptual philosophy don't need to construe their thesis using the word 'about'. Rather, couldn't they say that although there are some questions that aren't even implicitly about language and/or thought, nevertheless the only things we learn from asking and answering those questions are things about language and/or thought? In other words, even if we grant that some philosophical questions aren't even implicitly about language and/or thought, can't we still coherently worry about always being "stuck within" the realm of language and/or thought? I have some friends here at Riverside who seem to take this sort of line, at least.

So, I felt a little bit like Williamson wasn't taking the opposition as seriously as he ought to have been.

Progressives

Suppose I am baking a loaf of bread. Does this entail that there will, at some time, be a loaf that I baked. I think so. But, I have recently learned that this is a rather unpopular position. I'd like to consider the case for my position and how it fares compared to the standard position.

The standard position implies the fact that I am baking a loaf of bread does not entail that there will, at some time be a loaf of bread that I baked. This is upheld by our intuitions in the following case. Suppose that I am engaged in what seems like bread making activities. I make a dough and let it rise and stick it in the oven. However, soon after putting the dough in the oven, my kitchen explodes. The police come by to take a report on the incident. It seems like I can truly say to the police that I was baking a loaf of bread when the kitchen exploded. In fact that seems like a natural thing to say. However, this supports the standard position: the fact that I am baking a loaf of bread does not entail that there will, at some time, be a loaf that I baked.

I think the case for the standard position is rather strong. But, I don't think it is definitive. Let's give a second case and see if there is any intuition (even a slight one) against the standard position.

Suppose that while I'm giving my statement to the police I say that I was baking a loaf of bread when the kitchen exploded. But, suppose that one of the police officers asks to see the loaf of bread I was baking. I respond by saying that there is no loaf, that my dough was destroyed in the disaster. He responds by saying "I guess you weren't baking a loaf of bread then". What the officer says is annoying. What he says isn't even a funny joke. But, what he says doesn't strike me as obviously false. In fact, it seems that his joke relies on taking our language literally. If this intuition is right, then the standard view is false. That I am baking a loaf of bread does entail that there will, at some time, be a loaf that I baked.

That second case is not obvious. But, I do have a slight intuition in favor of saying that the officer spoke truly. That gives me a small reason to believe that the standard view is false. But, perhaps it isn't enough of a reason to defeat the very plausible case that was made in favor of the standard view.

But, here is a third case. Suppose I am engaged in what seems like bread making activities. I make a dough and let it rise and stick it in the oven. However, soon after putting the dough in the oven, some crazy quantum even occurs that rearranges the material in the oven to form cookies. The police come by to take a report on this very strange incident. I say that I was baking a loaf of bread but that when I opened the oven I discovered cookies instead of a loaf of bread. Now the officer says "I guess you weren't baking a loaf of bread then." Now I have an even stronger intuition to say that the police officer spoke truly.

Now, if we add to these intuitions that the semantics for "Joshua is baking a loaf of bread" will be much simpler if standard view is false, then I think we have a decent case against the standard view. On the non-standard view I am considering, "S is baking a loaf of bread" expresses a truth in English iff S is baking and S's baking activity will result in a loaf of bread. In fact, I am inclined to make success a necessary condition of any progressive verb phrase.

On the other hand, one who endorses the standard view will have to say something like the following: 'S is baking a loaf of bread' expresses a truth in English iff S engaged in an activity that tends toward a loaf of bread being produced. It is very unclear what "tends toward" means here. Moreover, if we try to make a general semantics for progressives, the standard view seems to get into more trouble. It seems very that an activities tending toward a loaf of bread being produced is different from, for example, an activities tending toward a leaf being produced. But, presumably, the semantics for 'X is growing leaves' on the standard position will be something like x is engaged in an activity that tends toward leaves being produced. Finally, the standard view will have to accept that some progressives have success conditions. For example, the fact that S is conquering Poland definately entails that S succeeds in his conquest. So, the standard view will have an even sloppier semantics because the standard view will have to distinguish between those progressives that have success conditions and those that do not.

So, the fact that my non-standard view supports the intuitions in cases 2 and 3 and the fact that my non-standard view allows for a clear and simple semantics whereas the standard view does not, seems to provide a pretty decent case in support of that non-standard view.

Putnam's Paradox

I was thinking about Putnam's paradox the other day. I thought of a parallel between Putnam's paradox and a problem in the vagueness literature that seems interesting. I'd like to talk about this parallell in this post, but let me warn everyone that there are two things that I don't know much about that play an important role in this post: First, I don't know much about Putnam's paradox and second, I don't know much about vagueness. So, I might be completely confused and not really understand the issues.

First, let me present Putnam's paradox and a kind of naive response. then, I'll present an objection to that response. finally, I'll introduce a vagueness problem and a naive response along with an objection to that response. I hope to give a kind of response to both objections that might seem unsatisfactory.

So, here is my attempt to remember Putnam's paradox. I might be misremembering the problem and I am very sorry if I am. Let's take a theory to be a set of sentences in a first order language. Now, these three things seem true, but cannot all be true: (1) The meaning of the terms in a theory is determined by our use of those terms. But, (2) for any consistent theory, there is an interpretation of that theory which is both consistent with our use of the terms in the theory and that makes the theory true of the actual world. And, of course, (3) not every theory is true of the actual world.

I believe that the standard reply is to reject (1) and say that something besides our use determines reference (perhaps some entities are reference magnets). However, here is a different, naive response that appeals to a hiarchy of theories. Let's take theory T and take a second theory T* that is a theory about the referents of the words in T. Perhaps T* says something about causal connections betweem various objects and terms or perhaps it says something about spatiotemporal eligability. Who knows. It doesn't really matter. What does matter is that there is a theory that says that some interpretation of T that is the intended interpretation and explains why that is the intended interpretation. This is the niave response. Hee is what I like about it. It does not metaphysically privilage any particular properties in the world. Unfortunately, I am not exactly sure which of (1)-(3) this view rejects.

Putnam has an objection to this kind of response. He points out that T* is just more theory. For any theory about T, there will be an interpretation of that theory which is both consistent with our use of the terms in the theory and that makes the theory true of the actual world. the paradox just arises again at another level. Of course, we can go up another level, but the paradox will rear its ugly head up there as well. There is no way to escape the problem.

So, that is the paradox, the naive response and the objection to that response. Now, I'd like to consider a problem concerning vagueness.

Some people like linguistic theories of vagueness. They say that vagueness is rooted in our failure to determine by our word use one particular meaning over some other meanings. What a niave linguistic theorist would like to say is that there are a bunch of vague terms T1, T2, ..., Tn and that T1 is vague because out use of it indicates that it might mean P or Q or R and T2 is vague because out use of it indicates that it might mean . . . and so on.

Unfortunatley, one can object to the niave view by pointing out that the niave linguistic theorists theory is expressed in a vague language as well. Moreover, although we might be able to give an account of the vagueness in that second langauge, we will only do so by introducing more vagueness. Just as with Putnam's paradox, there is no escape.

What I'd like to say in response to the objection to the niave linguistic view of vagueness is that there is just vagueness all the way up. sure we have a theory T that is vague and a theory about T that is also vague and a thoery about that that is also vague. But, that is just the nature of vagueness. T is vague, our theory about T is vague, our theory about our theory about T is vague and so on.

I'd like to say something similar about Putnam's paradox. Lets say a theory that is subject to radical interpretation is Putnamable. Now, a theory T is putnamable. And there is a theory about T that indicates why one interpretation is favored over another. But that theory is Putnamable as well. Moreover, there is a theory about the theory about T and this third theory is Putnamable and so on.

McDowell's Argument

Williamson criticises Mcdowell's argument for the conclusion that the things one can mean or think just are the things that are (or might be) the case. I don't quite understand how this thesis is supposed to fit into the broader picture that Williamson is criticising (perhaps someone help me understand that), but it seems to me that Williamson's criticisms are mistaken. Here is Mcdowell's argument:

1. When we think truly, what we think is what is the case.
2. The world is everything that is the case.
3. So, when we think truly, what we think is the world.

I think that this argument is rather confusing. But, Williamson seems to suggest that (1) is false. Many things about this argument confuse me, but the truth of (1) is not one of them (at least on the charitable readings of (1)). Williamson's objections to (1) have to do with the claim that (A) the content of our thoughts are fine grained whereas (B) the things that are the case are not. So, for example, Williamson says that what we think when we think that Hesperus is hot is different from what we think when we think that Phosphorus is hot. But, what is true when Phosphorus is hot is the same thing that is true when Hesperus is hot. So, that which is the case is different from what is thought.

It seems to me that there are two options here. Either some broadly Fregean-like thesis is true or it is not. That is, either the thought that Hesperus is hot is the same as the thought that Phosphorus is hot or it is not. If it is, then it seems that there are two different things that are true. Namely that Hesperus is hot and that Phosphorus is hot. That is, there are two different things that are the case: that Hesperus is hot and that Phosphorus is hot. This commits us to the claim that what is the case is not merely an object's having a property. Rather what is the case is a complex entity made up out of fregean senses. In other words, the very same fregean proposition that is believed is also the thing that is the case. This indicates that (B) is mistaken.

On the other hand, if the broadly Fregean thesis is false, then the thought that Hesperus is hot is the same as the thought that Phosphorus is hot. But, this indicates that (A) is mistaken.

Williamson admits that there are various ways to take McDowell's claims, some of which will make the argument go through and others of which will not. However, Williamson also claims that the weaker readings will not bear the weight of the arguments McDowell puts on them. Of course, I don't know exactly what McDowell hopes to accomplish and how it fits into the broader picture that Williamon is criticising. So, for all I know, Williamson is right. But, I wish I understood this section of the chapter better enough to know whether he is right and to know why he is right.

I also have a couple of questions/complaints about Williamson's objection involving elusive objects. Williamson says that McDowell's argument relies on the thesis that everything is thinkable. He then suggests that we have no reason to think that there are no elusive objects (objects which are not individually thinkable). Suppose Williamson is right that we have no reason to think that there are no elusive objects. If that is true, does it really hurt McDowell. Can't McDowell make his point (whatever it may be) with the thesis that everything is either individually or collectively thinkable. If McDowell's argument requires only this weaker thesis, then Williamson's criticism is no good.

Finally, I am skeptical of the claim that we have no reason to believe that there are no elusive objects that are not also enigmas (objects which cannot be thought of either individually or collectively). Here is an argument that relies on several conroversial claims, but which I think may be sound. Suppose that arbitrary naming really does result in a particular object being named and that we can think of an object when we have a name for it. Now, if some objects can be thought of collectively, then we can name any one of them by saying "let 'Fred' name an arbitrarily chosen object from amongst those that we can think of collectively". Once we have the name 'Fred' we can think about whichever object was named. But, since any one of the objects could have been named, any one of the objects can be thought of individually. So, any objects that can be collectively thought of can also be individually thought of. So, any elusive objects must also be enigmas.

Philosophy vs. Science

Okay so I guess I'll get things started here on the Williamson book. First, let me say to Joshua: nice pick. The first chapter has sufficiently whetted my philosophical appetite. Second, let me say that I haven't ever thought very hard about issues of philosophical methodology, so you should certainly take all of my posts here in a spirit of open inquiry. With that, I'll give a bit of autobiography that was inspired by chapter one.

When I teach intro to philosophy, I usually start with a thought-experiment. (Typically, I have them imagine that Harry and Hermione switch brains in an attempt to foil Lord Voldemort's plan to kill Harry. I then ask them to imagine that they are Voldemort's closest advisor and they have to tell him which brain-body pair to kill, given that he wants to kill (and only kill) Harry.) I then usually give a spiel about thought-experiments in general and their value for philosophy. My explanation of their value is an analogy usually along the following lines.

If you want to know how a microwave succeeds in heating up whatever you put in it, you would come up with an hypothesis and then put it to the test. Hypothesis: It works by agitating water molecules. Test: Put oil in the microwave and see whether it gets hot. Depending on the results, your hypothesis is either confirmed or disconfirmed by the data. Something similar happens in philosophy. If you want to know why humans are more morally valuable than ants, you would come up with an hypothesis and then put it to the test. Hypothesis: They are more morally valuable because they have human DNA. Test: Imagine that we encountered a race of non-human aliens that were otherwise exactly like us. Would they be less morally valuable just because they didn't share our DNA? Again, the hypothesis is confirmed or disconfirmed by the data.

Drawing this parallel seems to steer the students away from thinking of philosophy merely as the analysis of our concepts and toward thinking of it as a way of finding out things about the world itself. At the same time, however, the data of thought-experiments seem to be some sort mental stuff -- intuitions, considered judgments, or something like that. Moreover, I sometimes describe the point of the Harry Potter thought-experiment in terms of the pressure that it puts on our ordinary concept of personhood. So am I really still stuck inside the conceptual turn that Williamson argues we have moved beyond?

In light of the above autobiography, I'd be curious to hear how you all describe the goal of philosophy to your intro students, or whether you even think it is useful to do so. And, more generally, how far off is my above description, even if it is pedagogically useful?

A Default Argument for Atheism

Michael Tooley (2008) argues that atheism is the default position. His argument is simple and can be strengthened. I will state his argument briefly and then strengthen it. I will then discuss a few responses that one might make to the strengthend argument, and, following this, offer a few reasons to doubt that these responses are successful. My conclusion will be a rather strong one: we should be atheists.

Tooley's Argument

Premise One: The prior probability that God exists is 1/3.
Premise Two: If (P1), then atheism is the default position.
Conclusion: Atheism is the default position.

An Argument for (P1)

Premise One*: The prior probability that a being that is jointly omnipotent and omniscient is also morally good is 1/3.
Premise Two*: If (P1*), then the prior probability that God exists is 1/3.
SubConclusion: The prior probability that God exists is 1/3.

An Argument for (P1*)

Premise One**: A being that is jointly omnipotent and omniscient will be either (a) morally bad, or (b) indifferent, or (c) morally good.
Premise Two**: The prior probabilitity that a being that is jointly omnipotent and omniscient will be morally good = the prior probability that he will be morally indifferent = the prior probability that he will be morally bad.
Premise Three**: If (P1**) and (P2**) are true, then the prior probability that a being that is jointly omnipotent and omniscient is also morally good is 1/3.
SubConclusion: The prior probability that a being that is jointly omnipotent and omniscient is also morally good is 1/3.

An Argument for (P2)

Premise One***: If the prior probability that God exists is 1/3, then we should believe it is 1/3 likely that God exists before considering any other evidence.
Premise Two***: If we should believe it is 1/3 likely that God exists before considering any other evidence, then were we forced to believe that (a) God exists, or (b) God does not exist, we should believe that God does not exist.
Premise Three***: If were we forced to believe that (a) God exists, or (b) God does not exist, we should believe that God does not exist, then atheism is the default position.
SubConclusion: If the prior probability that God exists is 1/3, then atheism is the default position.

That's the argument. Note, too, that it is assumed throughout the argument that God exists iff God is jointly omnipotent, omniscient and morally good. Now, I don't think that believing it is 1/3 likely that P makes it reasonable to believe that not-P. But Tooley can concede this point and simply stipulate that by 'default position' he means simply that, were we forced to gamble as to whether God exists, prior to obtaining further evidence, we should gamble that God does not exist.

This is an interesting argument and what seems to me even more interesting is that it can be significantly strengthened. We can partition degrees of moral goodness more finely than Tooley does. That is, assuming that (a) moral goodness comes in infinitely many quantities and (b) God exists only if he has exactly the highest possible quantity of goodness, and (c) there is a highest possible quantity of goodness, we get the conclusion that the prior probability that God exists is either zero or infinitesimal. If the prior probability is zero, no evidence can raise the probability that God exists. If it is infinitesimal, then it would take, well, a whole lot of evidence to raise the probability that God exists. We have no such evidence (even fine-tuning wouldn't get us this) and so we should be atheists.

The Strengthened Argument

Premise One: The prior probability that God exists is 0 or infinitesimal.
Premise Two: If (P1), then atheism is the default position.
Conclusion: Atheism is the default position.

An Argument for (P1)

Premise One*: The prior probability that a being that is jointly omnipotent and omniscient is also morally good to the highest possible degree is 0 or infinitesimal.
Premise Two*: If (P1*), then the prior probability that God exists is 0 or infinitesimal.
SubConclusion: The prior probability that God exists is 0 or infinitesimal.

I won't repeat the rest of the defense. The defense is relevantly the same. But here is another way to make the point in the form of an argument from analogy.

Suppose a solid were to pop into existence moving at a constant velocity. Let's say the solid is the referent of 'Fred' iff the solid has a mass of exactly 6 units, a volume of exactly 6 units, and a velocity of exactly 6 units. Suppose now that, in fact, a solid pops into existence in front of you and you can see it and watch it moving. What is the prior probability that that solid is Fred? The idea is that the prior probability is either 0 or infinitesimal. In order to be Fred the solid must have a precise combination of three properties, each of which comes in infinitely many quantities. Since any combination is, prior to evidence, just as likely as another, the probability that the solid is Fred = 1/infinity (which means it is either 0 or infinitesimal depending upon which math is correct). Thus, we should think that it is very likely indeed that the solid we are looking at is not Fred. What's more, it would take a whole lot of evidence to make it reasonable to believe the solid is Fred. The same goes for God.

Response One:

Surely we could get evidence that I exist (just look at me) and we could know that I have some exact quantity of a variety of properties that come in infinite quantities. So, can't the same be true of God?

No. God is defined as a being with the highest quantity of omniscience, omnipotence, and moral goodness. Unlike God, I am not defined as such a being. We could get evidence that I exist without getting evidence that, for some particular weight, I have that weight. This is not so for God. If we get evidence that God exists, then we must get evidence that a being with the highest quantity of those three properties exists.

Response Two:

We could still get evidence, even if this argument is sound, that there is a being that is jointly omniscient and omnipotent is also very morally good, for some range of quantities of goodness.

Yes. I am assuming that God, if He exists, has the highest of such a range. A being that has less than the highest degree of goodness, I am assuming, is unfit to be the referent of 'God'.

Response Three:

But it seems possible to get evidence that the solid is Fred. Couldn't God tell you this? And couldn't you imagine a possible instrument that could, having measured the solid, make it reasonable to believe the solid is Fred. And so, shouldn't we say the same for God?

First, supposing this is right, what premise is false? Second, perhaps we should simply say that 'no' we could not get such evidence and that's just a strange, but correct consequence of dealing with properties that admit of infinitely many quanitities. Infinitity is strange, but notice, even the theists trafficks in infinity talk and so she should be the last person to doubt the intelligibility of its application.

So, what do you think readers?