Sketching the First Half

Having just completed the (epic) fourth chapter, it seems to me that the general agenda Williamson had for the first half of the book is now over and the fifth chapter will take us onto something new. With this in mind, perhaps it will be helpful (I'll find it helpful, at any rate) to look back on what Williamson was up to in the first half, now that I have the wisdom of hindsight.

Here's the short version as I see it, though I'm certainly open to being corrected.

Some people seem to think that what distinguishes philosophy from other disciplines is that philosophy is in some distinctive sense merely linguistic or conceptual (chapter 1). Two questions: what could they mean by this, and is it true? Here's one thing they could mean: all philosophical theses are about language or thought. But this is false (chapter 2). Here's another thing they could mean: all philosophical theses are analytic and so less substantial than the theses of other disciplines. But this is false if we understand analyticity in terms of a metaphysical criterion like "truth in virtue of meaning" (chapter 3). It's also false if we understand analyticity in terms of an epistemological criterion like "assent entailed or constituted by understanding" (chapter 4). So without any idea about what else people might mean by saying that philosophy is primarily linguistic or conceptual, we can tentatively conclude that it's not.

Does this seem like a fair characterization of the first half of the book? If so, why the heck was the first half so long? :)

My main complaint about the argument up to this point is the same one I've shared before: that it doesn't seem like he clearly identifies his opponent. Surely someone could admit that not all philosophical theses are about language (or thought) and also admit that not all philosophical theses are analytic in any sense and yet also maintain that at best philosophy can help us learn about ourselves and not the world around us. Perhaps this character would have to deny the sort of claim that Joshua has pushed in some of the previous comment threads -- namely, that one perfectly good way to learn about the world is by learning about ourselves. But it seems to me that THIS is where the dispute is located...not in the sort of pedantic maneuvers involved in trying to come up with an adequate conception of analyticity.